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ABSTRACT
The story of the Sicilian immigrants’ experiences in Louisiana is a tale of racial
and ethnic evolution in the face of physical threats. With the end of the Civil War, many
emancipated slaves migrated to other parts of the country, which left Louisiana planters
in need of laborers. Planters turned to European labor to fill that need, bringing
thousands of Sicilian peasants to work on their plantations. Extreme poverty and
oppression made the opportunity to emigrate highly attractive, but Sicilians found
problems in Louisiana as well. In addition to low wages, crowded living conditions,
discrimination, and violence, the immigrants faced the threat of disease.
Yellow fever was a recurring threat to the city of New Orleans, striking the city
seemingly at random. The 1905 yellow fever epidemic dealt a heavy blow to this ethnic
community; an unpredictable killer that tended to hit newcomers the hardest. This fact,
along with Sicilian cultural beliefs, language barriers, and the racial tensions of the times
influenced how the Sicilian immigrants reacted during the yellow fever epidemic. For
the most part, the Sicilian community was insular and distrustful of outsiders, especially
the doctors and authority figures. During the epidemic, efforts to educate the public
about the disease slowly began to influence a transformation within the Sicilian
community. This transformation influenced their racial and ethnic evolution from Dago
to white, leading to, at least a partial, assimilation into American culture. This thesis is
the story of that transformation.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
“Their [Italian immigrants] struggles in a new land contained more than just
tales of the immigrant experiences in a strange country; they were a story of survival in a
hostile environment based on their ethnic background and their inability to conform to
the prejudices of whites” (Gauthreaux 2014, 14).

Overview
As Gauthreaux (2014) argued in the above quote, Italian and Sicilian immigrants
faced a hostile environment that threatened their survival; however, this thesis proposes
that the tale goes beyond that survival. The story of the Sicilian immigrants’ experiences
in Louisiana is a tale of racial and ethnic evolution in the face of physical threats. At the
end of the nineteenth century, thousands of Sicilian peasants were recruited from Sicily
and brought as immigrants to Louisiana to replace former slave labor. With the end of
the Civil War, thousands of emancipated slaves either migrated to other parts of the
country or demanded improvements on the plantations where they worked as share
croppers (Baiamonte 1969; Durso 2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996; J. A. Scarpaci 1972;
and V. Scarpaci 2003). Louisiana planters saw the recruitment of European labor as a
means to replace the numbers of black workers who left the area for better living
conditions, the possibility of higher wages, and other benefits (Baiamonte 1969;
Edwards-Simpson 1996; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003). The need for cheap
labor eventually convinced plantation owners, and railroad investors, to actively recruit
Sicilians, and non-Sicilian Italians, to fill those labor needs (Durso 2012, 2).
Planters first looked to northern European countries for workers; however, Sicily
proved a viable source of laborers because extreme poverty and political oppression made
the opportunity to emigrate highly attractive to Sicilian peasants (Baiamonte 1969; Durso
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2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003). The call of
the Louisiana planters offered an end to the plight of the Sicilian farmer, and enticed
thousands of peasants to board hundreds of ships bound for the United States. After
arrival, some immigrants remained in the United States, worked the harvest and then
found other work. Others stayed only long enough to save enough of their meager wages
to buy land back in Sicily and get out from under the control of the landowners (Durso
2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003). Despite the
odds against them, many immigrants managed to amass enough money to purchase land
and start their own businesses in the United States (Durso 2012, 2).
Among the troubles and dangers faced by Sicilian immigrants was the threat of
disease; in 1905, it was yellow fever (Durso 2012, 2; Edwards-Simpson 1996; J. A.
Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003). Yellow fever is a viral infection that is
transmitted via the bite of the female of the mosquito species Aedes aegypti (Bryan et al.
2004; The Great Fever 2006; Humphreys 1992; Patterson 1992). It was the most
terrifying disease at the time, a seasonal foe that struck the coastal cities in the United
States seemingly at random, occurring one summer, but not the next. Further, although it
had been proven to be carried by mosquitoes, this fact was not yet well established in
1905 New Orleans. Yellow fever was still considered unpredictable, and it could be
devastating.
The 1905 occurrence, while not one of the worst epidemics in history, still dealt a
heavy blow to the Sicilian community and one could argue that it had a profound effect
on the immigrant community. Prior to, and during, the epidemic the Sicilian community
was insular and distrustful of outsiders, especially the doctors and authority figures
11

(Edwards-Simpson 1996). This behavior, along with other traditional Sicilian cultural
beliefs, language barriers, and the racial tensions of the time, influenced how the Sicilian
immigrants were treated and how they reacted to the rest of the community (Durso 2012;
Edwards-Simpson 1996; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003). Fortunately, the
persistence of city and government officials in educating the public, specifically the
immigrant population, slowly began to influence a change in the community. Sicilians
began to accept the help of the doctors and to follow the recommended steps to eradicate
the mosquitoes in their homes and in their communities (Carrigan 1988; Durso 2012;
Edwards-Simpson 1996). This relaxation of cultural barriers on the part of the Sicilian
community began a transformation from within that helped to shape Sicilians’
assimilation into American culture as Italian Americans.
This thesis examines the role of the 1905 yellow fever epidemic in the ethnic
development of the Sicilian community and argues that, along with other influential
factors, the yellow fever epidemic helped to precipitate a transformation in the ethnic
identity of the Sicilian community. Materials examined included primary sources such as
books, articles, government documents, newspapers and publications of the day. These
materials provided the means to detail the history surrounding Sicilian immigration,
background information about yellow fever and its eradication, as well as how these
events brought about changes in the Sicilian community.
Chapter one provides a brief overview of the story being told. It also provides the
research questions and a list of the definitions used in the body of this work. Chapter two
provides the literature review. It examines the anthropological concepts on race,
ethnicity, and identity construction; and Italian American ethnicity used in this thesis. It
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also provides a review of sources on the history of Sicilian immigration, particularly the
factors that influenced emigration and immigration, as well as those on the threats faced
by the immigrants after their arrival in Louisiana. Each of these topics is then expanded
upon in the subsequent chapters. Chapter three details the methods and materials used in
creating this thesis. It includes a brief overview, a section detailing the archives and
repositories consulted, and the scope of materials used. It also discusses the process and
methodology utilized in building this work. Chapter four begins detailing the story of
this thesis. It provides a deeper interpretation of the factors that influenced emigration
from Sicily and immigration into Louisiana, as well as a look at the prejudices with
which Sicilian immigrants became viewed once ensconced in the work of the plantation.
It also examines the political and economic environment in play in the late eighteenhundreds, both in Louisiana and in Sicily. These factors played a major role in the
evolution of Sicilian immigrants’ ethnic identity. Chapter five examines yellow fever
including its epidemiology and symptoms, through the various theories that have been
believed through the years, to the discovery of the mosquito connection. Chapter six
brings the previous chapters together to build a picture of the Sicilian immigrants’
experiences during the 1905 yellow fever epidemic and how those experiences connect to
the evolution of Sicilian ethnic identity from Dago to White. Chapter seven provides a
synthesis of the concepts argued in this work. It pulls from theory and history both to
reveal the evolution of Sicilian ethnicity from Dago to white.
Research Questions
1. What factors influenced Sicilian emigration from Sicily and immigration into
Louisiana?
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2. What dangers or threats did the immigrants face and what forms did these threats
take? How did these threats influence Sicilian ethnic evolution?
3. How did native Louisianans perceive the Sicilian community?
4. How did city authorities manage the 1905 yellow fever epidemic and how did this
affect the Sicilian community?
5. What is yellow fever and how did it impact the city of New Orleans in 1905?
6. How did yellow fever impact the Sicilian immigrant population and what role did
the epidemic play in the Sicilian community’s racial and ethnic evolution?
Definitions and Terms Usage.
1. Contagious also describes a disease that is transmitted on contact (Augustin 1909,
3).
2. Dago was a derogatory term used to refer to both Sicilians and Italians. Some
sources say it derived from the Spanish name, Diego, and was used to disparage
those of Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese descent (Times-Picayune 1898).
3. Economic mobility refers to a person’s ability to move up or down between
higher or lower levels of economic stature in areas of income, education, type of
employment and standard living conditions (Gans 2007, 154).
4. Endemic applies when a disease is prevalent or permanently established in a
particular location and local conditions enable its existence (Augustin 1909, 2).
5. Epidemic refers to any disease that infects many people in a particular location
and time that spreads rapidly despite extensive efforts to stop or contain it
(Augustin 1909, 1).
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6. Ethnicity is used to distinguish between groups of people with shared cultural
traits, and common ancestral origins.
7. Fomites are the physical materials, such as bedding or clothing that were believed
to absorb or retain germs, thus enabling the spread of disease from infected
persons to healthy persons (Augustin 1909, 2).
8. Infectious refers to any disease that can be transmitted through the air, water, or
fomites (Augustin 1909, 3).
9. Italian when used is referring to those who emigrated from mainland Italy, both
northern and southern regions. Where sources used both Italian and Sicilian to
refer to the same immigrant group, I have kept to the term used by the source.
10. Negro is used in context of the historical records from which the information was
taken. Where necessity called for it, the term black or blacks is used rather than
the term African American to keep to the historical feel of the story being created.
Use of the more modern term African American is used when referring to modern
times.
11. Quarantine originally referred to the forty days that a ship had to remain isolated
if anyone on board was ill, or if the ship had come from a place believed to have
pestilence present. The length of time allotted for quarantine in the United States
ranged from about one week to twenty days (Augustin 1909, 6).
12. Race is used as it was in 1905; to denote different groups of people based on skin
color.
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13. Sicilian refers to the majority of the immigrants who lived and worked in New
Orleans during the yellow fever epidemic; therefore, it is used in this work as the
main ethnic group of study.
14. Social mobility refers to a person’s ability to move up or down between higher or
lower levels in social class, status, or position (Gans 2007, 154).
15. Sporadic refers to occurrences when a disease occurs in isolated cases and in
irregular patterns and its spread is easily remedied (Augustin 1909, 2)
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
Secondary materials included books, articles, theses and dissertations that
provided the preliminary background information about the era, the people, and the
events that were the focus of this study. These sources also included anthropological
discourse concerning “race” versus “ethnicity”, discussions on racial and ethnic
categorization, as well as ethnic development and identity construction. These theories
laid the foundation on which was built the framework of ethnic identity construction
amidst issues of racial and ethnic categorization and physical threat.
Anthropological Concepts
Race versus ethnicity. The terms race and ethnicity can be confusing and difficult
to grasp however, having a clear definition for these terms was crucial for understanding
the processes that shape racial or ethnic categorization and identity construction.
Therefore, it was necessary to examine how race and ethnicity have been defined in the
past. Some secondary sources used the terms race and ethnicity as synonyms. Others
argued that historically, the term “race” has a biological basis on skin color while
“ethnicity” refers to cultural differences (Bartlett 2001; Gravlee 2009).
Bartlett’s (2001) work examined historical views of race and ethnicity. He argued
that in the past, different people saw the distinctions between the two terms in different
ways in contrast to modern social science’s view that race is a social construct while
ethnicity is not (Bartlett 2001, 3). Expressing his own opinion, he argued that race and
ethnicity “both refer to the identifications made by individuals about the groups they
belong to” and should be used as synonyms (Bartlett 2001, 41). Bartlett argues that the
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term “race” should be “reclaimed from the racists”; that it can be made clear that race is
not a biological category (Bartlett 2001, 41). Bartlett makes a valid point, however, as he
also points out, there are biological differences between peoples (Bartlett 2001, 41).
Some more obvious that others, especially skin color. It is those obvious differences that
led to conflicts between different groups of people in New Orleans in 1905.
Conversely, Gravlee (2009) argued that one should ask if race is a “natural
biological division” or a “sociocultural phenomenon” (Gravlee 2009, 47), and proposed
that “social inequalities shape the biology of racialized groups, and embodied inequalities
perpetuate a racialized view of human biology” (Gravlee 2009, 48). This idea allows the
interpretation of the Sicilians situation in New Orleans in 1905, when people perceived
natural biological differences like skin color to denote racial categorization. This makes
Gravlee’s concept the most useful for this work because in 1905, social inequalities were
in play, and at that time, the term “race” was seen as applying to those with similar
biological attributes. The Sicilians, with their darker skin tone, were perceived as racially
different from whites and black. It was the racial views of the times that fueled the
political and social inequalities that served to divide whites, blacks and Italians;
immigrants and citizens. Further, these social inequalities played a significant role in the
development of the immigrants’ Italian-American identity, and their subsequent racial
categorization as white.
Racial categorization. The racial categorization of individuals and groups can
change through experience and education. In other words, experience or education can
alter how one is categorized by others, as well as how one categorizes those same others
in return. For example, Burkholder (2010) argued that during WWII educational
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institutions in the United States affected change in the way school children racially
categorized their neighbors (Burkholder 2010, 327). She cited Gillum’s (1941)
classroom experiment on racial tolerance. Gillum taught during World War II and at that
time the term “race” was being used to denote people from different ethnic groups like
Italians, Jews, Germans, French, and so on (Burkholder 2010, 327). This is an example
where confusion about the two terms can arise. Gillum’s use of the term “race” to denote
ethnicity differs from New Orleans in 1905 when “race” was associated with skin color.
Gillum’s lesson was intended to teach students racial tolerance for the European
descendants living in the neighborhood (Burkholder 2010, 324). The discussion taught
about European-American contributions to the United States. It also discussed the idea
that there were different hues of “whiteness” (Burkholder 2010, 325). This experience
was meant to influence students to change the way they categorized their neighbors.
Burkholder (2010) argued that by asserting that people of European descent were
Caucasian, Gillum only strengthened the association between race and color (Burkholder
2010, 327). Further, she argued that divisions between colors, even in degrees of
whiteness, were common in the United States during the twentieth century (Burkholder
2010, 325). These degrees of whiteness came into play during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century in New Orleans. The Sicilians, the Irish before them, were seen
in this divisive manner, not quite white or black. This racial categorization put them
somewhere in between the two, placing them within their own category of whiteness.
Events like the yellow fever epidemic highlighted those differences and helped prompt
Sicilians’ desire to be seen as white.

19

Ethnic categorization and identity construction. Like racial categorization, ethnic
categorization can be influenced by experiences. For example, Gans (1979) argued that
ethnic development is influenced by what goes on “in the larger society” as well as what
occurs among the ethnics themselves (Gans 1979, 16). In other words, the “motivating
force of experience and local circumstances”, plus social relationship patterns influence
ethnic development (Barth 2000, 27). Gans (1979) also argued that how ethnics are
treated by society in future encounters plays a part in ethnic development (Gans 1976,
16). Experience and education, however, are not the only stimulus to change in how
individuals or groups racially or ethnically categorize others. Jaspal and Cinnirella’s
(2011) Identity Process Theory is based on understanding the motivations behind identity
construction. Identity Process Theory proposes that “structure is regulated by the
assimilation-accommodation process and the evaluation process” (Jaspal and Cinnirella
2011, 505). In other words, ethnic identity develops through the process of becoming a
part of a community, as seen through one’s own interpretive lens and motivations, amidst
those outside forces [or threats] that inspire change. Further, they argued that one needs
to consider the motivations and “identity threat” that lie behind the construction of one’s
ethnic identity (Jaspal and Cinnirella 2012, 504).
Writing in a similar vein, Nagel (1994) offered the opinion that ethnic identity
resulted from individual choice as they defined themselves and others (Nagel 1994, 152).
One can argue that Nagel’s (1994) “choices” are similar to Jaspal and Cinnirella’s (2012)
“motivations” that inspire one to choose one path over another. Becker (2015) also
proposes that people’s choices play an important role in their ethnic identity construction.
For example, his study found that Albanians in New York City, motivated by a desire to
20

work in the Italian area, assumed an Italian ethnic “persona” in order to do so (Becker
2015, 111). This example of assumed ethnicity is evidence of how an individual, or
group of individuals from one ethnic group, can choose to “transition” into another ethnic
group. It was their own personal choices or motivations, influenced by their economic
environment that prompted the change.
Italian American ethnicity and assimilation. There are several works that
specifically study Italian American ethnicity (Alba 1999; De Fina 2014; Vecoli 2000), as
well as linguistics and identity construction (De Fina 2008). De Fina's (2014) article
examines ethnic identity construction and discusses prior studies including Alba's 1999
study on assimilation among groups of European descent, and Vecoli's 2000 study in
which he asks, “Are Italian Americans just white folks?” (Alba 1999 and Vecoli 2000, as
cited by De Fina 2014, 254). Further, De Fina’s 2008 work on narrative and language
discusses how stories shared among Italians help members with identity and association
with being Italian (De Fina 2008). De Fina speaks to how Italian Americans maintained
their cultural identity while “cultivating their Italian-American identity” (De Fina 2014,
259). Several scholars argue that the formation of American identity is influenced by
“assimilation” experiences (Alba 1999; De Fina 2008, 2014; Vecoli 2000).
History of Emigration and Immigration
Emigration from Sicily. Forces beyond the control of Sicilian peasants influenced
emigration from their homeland (Baiamonte 1969; Benjamin 2006; Durso 2012;
Edwards-Simpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; Scarpaci 1972; Scarpaci 2003). First, the
peasants lived in extreme poverty caused by agricultural problems and oppressive
taxation imposed by the Sicilian government (Baiamonte 1969, 2; Benjamin 2006).
21

Some scholars argued that Sicily’s agricultural woes could be partially blamed on the
United States, whose post-Civil War exports to Europe led to a decreased need for
Sicilian products (Benjamin 2006, Kindle 5784). Second, most of the land was managed
by oppressive overseers [the gabellotto], for wealthy owners, under a corrupt system that
peasants could not afford to join (Durso 2012, 13). This left them indebted to both the
gabellotto and the usually absentee owners (Durso 2012, 13). Third, Sicily’s export
business had taken another hit when European markets went into recession causing
Sicily’s export of wheat and sulfur to drastically decrease (Benjamin 2006, Kindle 5784).
These falls in export meant less work and more dire poverty for the Sicilian peasant,
which naturally increased the lure of emigration.
Immigration to Louisiana. The end of the Civil War also led to the labor dilemma
that plagued southern American planters (Baiamonte 1969; Durso 2012; EdwardsSimpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003).
Emancipation gave former slaves choices they never had before; they could choose where
to live and work. Many left Louisiana for Chicago and other cities, seeking better
economic opportunities (Durso 2012, 10). Those who remained in the state demanded
better wages and benefits, threatening strikes if their demands were not met (Durso 2012,
10). This migration of former slaves was often cited by planters as the catalyst to the
labor problems they faced after the Civil War (Baiamonte 1969; Durso 2012; EdwardsSimpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; V. Scarpaci 2003). Planters
claimed a need to seek workers from other places in the United States and northern
European nations and began to actively recruit people from these areas. Eventually,
Sicily was added to the list of viable sources for laborers from among the peasantry and
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efforts to bring in Sicilian immigrants began to increase (Baiamonte 1969; Durso 2012;
Edwards-Simpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; and V. Scarpaci 2003).
Sicilians responded by the thousands; they came expecting new opportunities and found
them but, those new opportunities came with unexpected risks as well.
Threats faced after immigration. The immigrant community faced discrimination,
prejudice and violence, as well as racial ambiguity that in some cases led to the lynching
of Sicilian immigrants. (Baiamonte 1969; Durso 2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996;
Gauthreaux 2014; J. A. Scarpaci 1972; V. Scarpaci 2003; Vellon 2003). EdwardsSimpson’s (1996) work provides a glimpse at the violence faced by Sicilian immigrants
in 1891 (Edwards-Simpson 1996). She recounts the events that led up to the lynching of
eleven Sicilian immigrants. The Sicilians had been accused of murdering the police chief
David Hennessy; they were found innocent by a white jury on March 13, 1891, which
enraged the public. On March 14, prominent New Orleans citizens led a vigilante mob to
the prison, overwhelmed the deputies and gained access to the prisoners (EdwardsSimpson 1996, 115). Edwards-Simpson’s description of what happened next reads like a
modern thriller as, “the self-appointed avengers then broke into small groups in search of
their prey” (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 115). Some were shot where they were found; one
other was dragged from the building and hung on a lamp-post (Edwards-Simpson, 115).
Other sources describing this same incident tell how that particular body had also been
used for target practice (Durso 2012; Gauthreaux 2014).
The Sicilian community was now seen as a group of criminals capable of any kind
of illegal or monstrous act. The native-born of New Orleans aimed their anger at the
entire Sicilian community. The phrase, “Who killa da chief?” became almost a slogan,
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being demanded of Sicilians of all ages and genders (The Great Fever 2006). The
violence perpetrated against Sicilian and non-Sicilian Italians, fueled distrust and
reinforced barriers between the immigrants and the native population. These barriers
played a significant role in the later 1905 yellow fever epidemic.
Discrimination in the form of low pay, poor housing, and social exclusion also
plagued the newcomers (Durso 2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; J. A.
Scarpaci 1972; V. Scarpaci 2003; Vellon 2003). Their willingness to work alongside
African-Americans in the fields and on the docks, and their unfamiliarity with Jim Crow
Laws left them as vulnerable to discrimination as their African American co-workers
(Baiamonte 1969; Durso 2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; Scarpaci
1972; Scarpaci 2003). This placed them in the lowest hierarchy in the society of New
Orleans, either just below or just above African-Americans in status, but most
definitively non-white (Durso 2012; Edwards-Simpson 1996; Gauthreaux 2014; Scarpaci
1972; Scarpaci 2003; Vellon 2003).
Vellon’s study of immigrants in New York also looked at the immigrants’
personal interpretation of race, particularly how they viewed themselves racially upon
coming to America, and the many factors that contributed to their becoming white
(Vellon 2003). He argued that “internal and external events” convinced Italians of the
need to perceive themselves as “white” (Vellon 2003, 196). He also argued that the
lynching of immigrants revealed to the immigrant population how racial hierarchies in
the United States worked, which reinforced the idea of becoming white (Vellon 2003, 5).
In other words, the immigrants learned that if they wanted to be accepted by the

24

American-born residents, they needed to change the native Louisianans perception that
Italians and Sicilians were just another black race.
Connections
The anthropological concepts above helped frame the story of the Sicilian
community’s transformation from Dago to white. To put it in perspective to the time
frame of this thesis, I propose that the evolution of Sicilian ethnic identity from dago to
white resulted from the choices that Sicilian immigrants made about their own ethnicity,
the racial tensions of the day, their experiences during the yellow fever epidemic, and
their personal motivations to change their standing in the community.
Prior research and historical documentation provided a basis for interpretation of
the experiences of the Sicilian immigrants within the historical setting, while allowing for
anthropological interpretation of those experiences. This thesis argues that the combined
influences of poverty, discrimination, prejudice, and violence drove the Italian
immigrants’ response to the yellow fever epidemic, which in turn influenced the
development of the community’s ethnic identity. This new identity was one which then
allowed them to carve out their own “niche in society” (Durso 2012; J. A. Scarpaci 1972)
as Italian-Americans.
Part of the goal of this project was to examine the assimilation or anti-assimilation
attitudes of the Sicilian community as evidenced by its reaction to city officials handling
to the yellow fever epidemic. Newspaper articles, public health reports, and other
documents of the time, made it possible to examine the changes that influenced Italian
American ethnic identity development, and how the Sicilian community viewed their
place in the larger community.
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CHAPTER III – METHODS AND MATERIALS
Overview
Methods involved searching historical documents such as newspapers, journals,
public health reports, print and video sources, and government documents including city
records, ordinances of the day, and other historical archival materials. These were
accessed through various archival sources, both in person and through online databases.
Documents on Italian and Sicilian immigration, city documents, census records,
newspaper articles, and official health records were used. Census, immigration, and
death records were used to compare death rates between the target community and the
rest of the city.
Archives and Repositories
Archival sources in New Orleans included the New Orleans Public Library, the
Louisiana Division/City Archives and Special Collections, the Howard-Tilton Memorial
Library of Tulane, and the Historic New Orleans Collection. Online repositories and
databases provided access to both primary and secondary sources. These included
GenealogyBank, HathiTrust, The Internet Archive, Library of Congress-Chronicling
America, NCBI-PubMedCentral, Openlibrary, and the United States Census Bureau.
Scope of Materials
The scope of the primary materials included journal articles, books, reports,
United States Census records, Louisiana State Government documents, newspaper
articles, and artwork. Primary books dated from 1844 to 1909, while primary reports
included items dated from 1902 to 1906. Each of these provided first-hand knowledge
and observations essential for this study. Early government documents spanned the years
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1879 to 1913; these provided essential documentation by official authorities that provided
the needed statistics to support this thesis. Primary source journal articles were dated in
the target year, 1905, although one could argue for the inclusion of one from 1925 as its
historical proximity and topic make it a vital source of information. These journal
articles provided first-hand experiences as well as time-sensitive scholarly works. The
last significant primary source materials were newspaper articles dated from 1880, 1898,
and 1904 to 1905. These provided essential commentary and facts about events prior to,
during, and after the 1905 yellow fever epidemic that are the supporting evidence in this
thesis.
Process
After perusing the literature, I made visits to the New Orleans Public library
where I examined the Louisiana Division/City Archives and Special Collections. There I
discovered that much of what I needed from that location, such as public health records
or city ordinances, could be accessed as easily online as on-site. Other on-site locations
included the Howard-Tilton Memorial Library at Tulane and the Historic Louisiana
Collection. These locations provided some books, both primary and secondary. As with
the Louisiana Public Library, I found that much of what I needed could also be found in
online databases or archives. While at these locations, however, I took notes, and phone
shots from yellow fever sources, which I also later found in online repositories or
databases.
Methodology
The scope of this study required a flexible methodology utilizing three areas of
anthropological thought encompassing race, ethnicity, and identity. First, Gravlee’s
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(2009) concepts about race and ethnicity and the workings of social inequalities
facilitated the interpretation of the political and social inequalities affecting the Sicilian
immigrant community in New Orleans in 1905. Second, Burkholder’s (2010) work
facilitated the interpretation of the ways that divisions of “whiteness” in New Orleans
marginalized the Sicilian community in the early 1900s, contributing to racial
categorization. Third, Jaspal and Cinnirella’s (2011) theory about the importance of
“motivation”, plus Nagel (1994) and Becker’s (2015) on “choice”, facilitated for
interpretation of those internal and external and forces that may have influenced change
within the Sicilian immigrant community. Fourth, Alba’s (1999) ideas about assimilation
facilitated the interpretation of Sicilians’ integration as Italian-Americans. These
concepts were used to interpret the experiences of the Sicilian immigrant population of
New Orleans as found within the historical records housed within various archival
resources.
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CHAPTER IV – GREAT MIGRATIONS
“At the end of the American Civil War in 1865, the southern economy lay in ruin
and thousands of freed black slaves sought to exercise their newly granted freedom”
(Gauthreaux 2014, 17).

Overview
Several factors, both in Sicily and in Louisiana, combined to bring Sicilians to the
state. What follows below outlines those factors such as economics, politics, and needs
of both planters and Sicilian that together acted as a catalyst to the immigration of
thousands of Sicilians. Also discussed are the conditions that immigrants discovered
upon their arrival to the plantations and those social threats that plagued them as they
adjusted to life in Louisiana.
Sicily to Louisiana
Economics in Louisiana. The end of the Civil War brought significant changes to
the economic environment of the state. Planters who had once relied on slave labor
found themselves faced with freedmen who quite naturally took advantage of their
emancipation to seek out better opportunities. By 1864, the number of sugar plantations
in Louisiana had dropped from the pre-war statistics of 1,200 to 175 (Durso 2012, 9). To
make things even more difficult, under Reconstruction, planters were required to make a
new pledge of allegiance to the United States before they could continue in business
(Durso 2012, 9). Planters also found that under the Reconstruction plan, planters were
required to make a new pledge of allegiance to the United States before they could
continue in business (Durso 2012, 9). Additionally, Reconstruction took away the State’s
power to govern itself and placed that power in Federal hands. In New Orleans as It
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Was: Episodes of Louisiana Life, published in 1895, Henry Castellanos provided a firstperson description of the plantation owners’ situation. He referred to the time as “an age
of so-called advancement and progress” and argued that the “staple productions of
Louisiana” were being threatened by the Federal tariff reforms (Castellanos 1895, 177).
Castellanos’ (1895) depiction reveals how Louisiana citizens in the late 1800s viewed
Federal involvement in the state. His sardonic rhetoric provides a glimpse into the
mindset of citizens affected by Federal involvement in the state.
Emancipation of the slaves further acerbated the planters’ perceived plight. As
stated earlier, emancipation allowed the freed men the choice to stay or to go, which in
turn led to a perceived scarcity of labor resources for the planters (Durso 2012, 9).
Therefore, planters began to re-think the practically of relying solely on the use of black
labor. A contemporary of the day, Walter L. Fleming (1905) gives a blunt and
derogatory example in his article about immigration into the South. “The negro cannot
furnish either in quality or in quantity the labor necessary to develop the South. By its
lack of initiative and inventive genius the black race has acted as a hindrance to progress”
(Fleming 1905, 279). Fleming’s derogatory statement is evidence of the state of affairs in
Louisiana, or at least of how it was perceived at the time, namely that former slaves were,
at the least, unreliable. Furthermore, there was a strong belief among the plantation
owners because former slaves were steadily leaving the state, plantations could not be
sustained without bringing in laborers. According to Baiamonte, “Almost all
contemporary reports, except those of Federal officials, maintained that the freedman
could not supply the needs of the South” (Baiamonte 1969, 18). Evidence for this view
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can be seen in newspapers that denounced the black laborers, adding fuel to the growing
sentiments of planters and the public alike. For example, The Lafayette Advertiser stated:
For years negro [sic] labor in the South has been growing more worthless and
unreliable. With plenty of work to do at good wages the negroes will not accept
employment, but on the contrary the tendency among them is to leave the country
and seek the cities where they eke out a miserable existence (Durso 2012, 11;
Scarpaci 1980, 2-3; Margavio and Salomone 2002, 35; Lafayette Advertiser 1904)
On January 3, 1880, The Weekly Thibodaux Sentinel blamed the situation on
“Kansas fever” (the mass migration of blacks from Louisiana to Kansas), which was
precipitated by the Democratic win in the Louisiana State elections for 1879 (The Weekly
Thibodaux Sentinel 1880). Whether or not the labor issue was a real is irrelevant; the
result was the same. The plantation owners wanted more reliable (at least in their view)
workers and they were willing to go overseas to get them. As we will see, the Sicilian
peasant was quite willing to answer that call. They came by the thousands, bringing their
own beliefs and expectations, seeking land and respectability. Each group was successful
to a certain extent; however, each group was also in for few surprises.
Economics in Sicily. The “new immigration period” in the United States took
place between 1880 and 1925 (Durso 2012, 2). Sicilian peasants made up a large portion
of these immigrants for many reasons. Sicily’s economy, at least for the peasant, was at
best a poor one. It relied in a large part on the ability to export fruit to the United States
and France. Also, the recession in Europe caused Sicily’s export of wheat and sulfur to
drastically decrease (Benjamin 2006, Kindle 5784).
Two major changes in world economics had a drastic effect on Sicily’s rural
population. First, Florida and California began to produce subtropical fruit, which
greatly lowered the need to buy lemons and oranges from Sicily (Baiamonte 1969, 3).
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Second, France levied a tariff against Italian wines, affecting both mainland Italy and the
island of Sicily (Baiamonte 1969, 3). These two events ruined growers all over the island
and made poor farmers even poorer.
The poverty experienced by Sicilian farmers was caused by agricultural problems,
politics, and unfair land laws (Baiamonte 1969, 9). Feudalism had been abolished
(Baiamonte 1969, 9), but the peasant was still essentially the serf in the system.
According to Baiamonte:
Under the Bourbon rulers the division of the lands was obviously uneven…the
larger proprietors acquired most of the acreage…what land the poor did receive
had to be sold for lack of capital or seized by the government for failure to pay
taxes (Baiamonte 1969, 9)
The peasants simply could not afford to either buy into the system, or even keep what
they had due to the oppressive taxation and unbalanced system of land distribution. Even
when the government distributed the lands of the Roman Catholic Church, it did not help
as two-thirds of it went to the wealthy (Baiamonte 1969, 9). The auction process was
also prohibitive, requiring one-tenth of the price at the time of the auction, with the rest
paid at six percent interest over a period of eighteen years (Baiamonte 1969, 9). In
addition to the unfair taxes and land distribution, the peasants faced forced conscription,
lack of educational opportunities, and natural and agricultural crises (Durso 2012, 30). It
is easy to see how this kept the poorer peasant population from making a bid at a better
life in the country of his birth.
The island was also experiencing a time of political change and upheaval. While
the unification of Italy was a political reality, it was not a physical reality because it
failed to join the different regions into an interconnected whole (Durso 2012, 29).
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Northern Italy enjoyed the fruits of modern industrialization, while southern Italy and
Sicily suffered destitute conditions under the system of absentee proprietors (Durso 2012,
29). The inability of the Sicilian peasant to prosper under such a system, and the stories
(Baiamonte 1969, 15) heard from those who had already emigrated, impacted the massive
response to the call for laborers in the United States. As Di Palma Castiglione said, “to
these people emigration offers the only relief” (Di Palma Castiglione 1905, 186).
Emigration not only offered peasants a chance to move beyond subsistence living, it also
offered them a chance to pursue their own dreams of proprietorship as farmers or other
business owners.
Recruitment of Sicilian peasants. Sugar Planters Association began to pressure
the state legislature for a solution; on March 17, 1866, the Louisiana Bureau of
Immigration was formed with the hope of bolstering “the number of white laborers” in
the state (Durso 2012, 11). At the 1867 conference, planters began to look to Sicily as a
possible solution to their labor needs (Durso 2012, 14). The chief officer of the
Louisiana Bureau of Immigration, James C. Kaufman, was placed in charge of publishing
circulars targeted at drawing both Americans and Europeans to Louisiana (Durso 2012,
11). These circulars, or pamphlets, praised Louisiana’s fertile soil, climate (comparing it
to Sicily), and provided information about the type of work available (Durso 2012, 11).
Advertisements, like the one shown in Figure 1, were a common sight, promoting “cheap
and convenient transportation” and “the spirit of adventure” to entice Europeans to
emigrate (Baiamonte 1969, 14-15; Durso 2012, 17).
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Figure 1. L’Italo Americano Labor Bureau recruitment poster.
Source: Durso 2012, 19.

In fact, the “new immigration” from Southern and Eastern Europe can be
attributed to the efforts of steamship and railroad companies’ advertisements (Baiamonte
1969, 14). These advertisements worked very well at recruiting potential workers. It was
not long before the lure of land ownership and the respect that comes with it (Durso
2012, 12-13) drew Sicilians to seek new opportunities in Louisiana. Three steamships
per month were running between New Orleans and Sicily by September of 1881 (Durso
2012, 17). At a cost of only forty dollars per person (Durso 2012, 17), the resulting mass
emigration is not surprising. The Louisiana Immigration League, formed in 1905, not
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only printed brochures in Italian and German, but also hired English-speaking Italians as
“labor agents” to extol the virtues of emigration (Durso 2012, 17). Sometimes, these
agents worked out of Ellis Island recruiting Italians, who entered the United States via
New York, for work in Louisiana (Durso 2012, 17). Some arrivals to New Orleans found
work as laborers and craftsmen while others found opportunities to open grocery stores or
shops (Baiamonte 1969, 33-34). However, most Sicilians and Italians were peasants or
laborers and mostly illiterate, though there were those who were “merchants, shoemakers,
barbers, carpenters, bricklayers, sailors, fishermen, and farmers” (Baiamonte 1969, 33).
The number of Sicilian immigrants arriving in the Port of New Orleans per ship
could range from a mere dozen, to over 1000 (Baiamonte 1969, 33). According to the
United States Census records for 1880, the number of foreign-born Italians in Louisiana
was just under 2500, by 1910 that number had risen to over 20,000 (Durso 2012, 18;
Tenth Census of the United States 1881, 511-12; Thirteenth Census of the United States
1910, 838). Durso points out, however, that these records do not account for those
temporary workers who came to Louisiana only during harvest season; she estimates
those numbers range from about sixty to eighty-thousand (Durso 2012, 20). Even though
many immigrants ended up working in New Orleans, the arrival of at least 20,000
foreign-born Italians (and Sicilians) within two decades suggest recruitment efforts were
successful.
Arrival of Sicilian Immigrants
Locations in the state. Plantations were located throughout the state; however,
this thesis was focused on areas in and around New Orleans. Following is a brief
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explanation of where these areas were and the parishes that were involved. Bertrand’s
map, shown in Figure 2, depicts ten different rural areas in the state (Bertrand 1955, 13).

Figure 2. Map of Rural Areas of Louisiana as Identified in 1955.
Source: Bertrand 1955, 13).

This thesis is concerned with two of these areas: area eight, called “The Sugar
Bowl Area”, and area ten, called “The New Orleans Truck and Fruit Area” (Bertrand
1955, 13). The Sugar Bowl area, so named for the large sugar plantations, includes the
parishes of “West Baton Rouge, Iberville, St. Martin, Iberia, St. Mary, Assumption,
Ascension, St. James, St. John-the-Baptist, Lafourche, and Terrebonne” (Bertrand 1955,
17). The New Orleans Truck and Fruit farming area includes the parishes of “St.
Tammany, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, and St. Charles” (Bertrand 1955, 19).
Unlike Bertrand’s work, Orleans parish is also a focus of this study. Many Sicilian
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immigrants worked alongside the native black population on these plantations. Others
began working in the more urban area of Orleans parish, eventually saved up to buy into
the sharecropping system or accepted the housing offered by some plantation owners
(Durso 2012, 34).
Work conditions. Sugar harvesting, considered the dirtiest and most physically
demanding type of work, occurred from October to January, while the less demanding
season of cultivation occurred from February to July (Durso 2012, 36). Generally,
Sicilians worked as unskilled cane cutters, making from $1.10 to $1.50, depending on the
success of the harvest (Baiamonte 1969, 35; Durso 2012, 37). A 1911 survey revealed
that on plantations with over 5000 workers; 52% of the employees received less than $.90
daily, 40% received $.90 to $1.50, daily, and only 8% more than $1.50 (Baiamonte 1969,
35). When one realizes that these wages were nearly twice what they were in Sicily, it is
not surprising that Sicilians chose to emigrate (Baiamonte 1969, 35).
Sicilians were also sometimes offered rent-free cabins (most likely those once
inhabited by slaves), with one or two rooms and a wood-burning stove (Baiamonte 1969,
35-36). The immigrants often planted vegetable gardens behind their cabins which
supplied them with food such as, various kinds of potatoes, and other vegetables,
including beans, squash, or greens (Baiamonte 1969, 37). But no Sicilian or Italian home
would be complete without bread and pasta. It was usual to see home-made pasta
hanging up to dry outside (Baiamonte 1969, 37). Bread would have been baked in handmade, domed ovens, built as they had been for centuries, with a single door and a floor of
baked earth (Costello 1998, 72). The aroma of fresh baked bread must have filled the air
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with its appealing scent. Families also raised chickens, which provided eggs, and goats,
which provided milk (Baiamonte 1969, 37).
At first, the Sicilians were considered better workers than African Americans
because they tended to produce more product (Durso 2012, 37). They were considered
“peaceable, and industrious…and cultivated their crops better than the Negroes”
(Baiamonte 1969, 39). Their willingness to suffer the dirtier and more difficult jobs
(Durso 2012, 36) while working in the heat and pestered by mosquitoes (Baiamonte
1969, 38-39) bolstered the belief in their admirable character. As Baiamonte put it,
“They were industrious, ambitious, very thrifty and not resigned to remain common
laborers for the rest of their lives” (Baiamonte 1969, 38-39). The immigrants worked
alongside the black workers; however, they did not always interact with them. There was
a tendency in some cases for Sicilians to keep to themselves. The Italian word,
campanilismo refers to this Sicilian tradition to keep to themselves. In Sicily, it meant
that one disregarded “everything outside of their village” (Durso 2012, 39). On the
plantations, campanilismo meant that the immigrants did not mix with “outsiders” like
the native whites and blacks (Durso 2012, 39). Therefore, little conflict occurred
between Sicilians and blacks as they were willing to work alongside each other (Durso
2012, 39).
However, Baiamonte asks a pertinent question: “Did the Italians supplant the
Negro in the sugar cane fields?” (Baiamonte 1969, 209). The simplest answer is “no.”
According to United States census records for the years 1880 through 1910, the
population of native blacks far outnumbered the numbers of immigrants coming from
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Italy. Table 1 provides the population data for the years 1880 to 1910 that I gathered
from United States Census’ online database library.
Table 1 Population of Italian/Sicilian & Blacks in LA, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910.
Ethnicity/Race

1880

1890

1900

1910

Blacks

493,655

559,193

650,804

713,874

Italian/Sicilian

2,527

7,767

17,431

20,233

Immigrants

Source: U. S. Census.gov; US Census records 1880 (387, 494); 1890 (414, 608); 1900 (cxii, cixxiv); 1910 (778).

As Table 1 clearly shows, for the year 1880, native blacks numbered 493,655 as
compared to only 2,527 immigrants from the whole of Italy; this represents 195 times the
number of Italian and Sicilian-born immigrants. While the numbers of immigrants from
Italy and Sicily steadily rose, so did the native black population, although not at the same
accelerated rate. By 1910, the native black population numbered 713,874, still more than
thirty-five times the number of Italian-born immigrants (US Census records 1880, 387,
494; 1890, 414, 608; 1900, cxii, cixxiv; 1910, 778). With these numbers of native blacks
remaining in the state, it hardly seems realistic to believe that Sicilian immigrants could
have supplanted the black workers despite implications that foreign labor could do so
(The Grenada Sentinel 1905).
Political environment. The political atmosphere in Louisiana from 1880 through
1910 was shaped by several events. For example, in 1879, Article 185 was added to the
Louisiana State Constitution, which gave immigrants the ability to vote (Baiamonte 1969,
40). Specifically, it gave:
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…all alien males who were twenty-one years or older the right to vote if they had
legally declared their intention to become United States citizens and had met the
necessary residency requirements (Louisiana Constitution 1879, Article 185: 45)
Thus, foreigners who had lived in Louisiana for one year, had spent at least thirty days in
the ward, and at least six months in the parish in which he planned to vote had suffrage
rights (Louisiana Constitution 1879, Article 185: 45). Then, in 1892, the sugar planters
successfully urged thousands of Italians and blacks to vote for the Democratic ticket in
efforts to ensure the election of Democrat Murphy J. Foster as governor (Baiamonte
1969, 40). While successful in getting Murphy J. Foster elected through encouraging
both Italians and blacks to vote democratic, the main motivation for getting the Italian
votes was to increase white solidarity in the state (Baiamonte 1969, 41).
Unfortunately for white supremacists, Italians and Sicilians were not responding
in the way they expected (Cunningham 1965, 25). According to Cunningham, “They
were not assimilating into the southern culture fast enough…this was reflected by the acts
of violence perpetrated against the Italians” (Cunningham 1965, 25). Because the
Sicilians and Italians were more apt to side with the blacks against those who
marginalized them, they became targets for violence in the same way that blacks were
targeted. The later violence that began to happen to Sicilians and Italians is evidence of
the negative impact that this association had within the immigrant community.
In 1894, Governor Foster proposed a suffrage amendment “which would
disfranchise” blacks by requiring educational and property qualifications (Baiamonte
1969, 43). By doing so, the Republican and Populist parties would lose the Black vote
(Baiamonte 1969, 43). The debate became national news, being written about in papers
such as the Cleveland Gazette, which quoted the amendment for all to see:
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This proposed amendment to the constitution provides that the voter:
Shall be an intelligent person, understanding the principles of our government,
and understand or interpret the constitution of this state when read to him, or shall
be a bona fide owner of property, real or personal, located in the state and
assessed to him for the year next preceding the election at a cash valuation of not
less than $500 (Cleveland Gazette 1894)
Further, the Cleveland Gazette (1894) quoted two southern papers: “it is frankly admitted
by the New Orleans Times-Democrat and the Picayune that this is an attempt to
disfranchise the greater part of the Negro” (Cleveland Gazette 1894). The amendment
was still a hot debate in 1896 when Populists and Italians argued against it. Despite their
earlier opposition to the amendment, the Times-Democrat denounced the Italians for their
part in the debate stating:
…when they [Italians – emphasis mine] interfere in American politics…they must
arouse a very strong feeling against themselves and against those who would stir
up these race prejudices, and organize the foreign-born population against the
natives, in order to foster their own personal interests (Times-Democrat 1896 as
quoted by Baiamonte 1969, 43).
The Sicilians and Italians paid a high price for their participation in the protests;
three were lynched in St. Charles Parish in 1896. An article in the Times-Democrat
described the scene at the funeral, “…a large number of Negroes and Italians were
present at the burial, and went home from the scene almost terror-stricken” (as cited by
Baiamonte 1969, 44). The tensions between the immigrants, blacks, and native white,
would continue to grow as those in government circles continued to try to control who
could, and who could not, vote.
On June 30, 1896, a bill requiring that the registrant had to complete the
application in his own handwriting (Baiamonte 1969, 45). The bill served as a “literacy
test” because it required the voter to write not only his name, but “his age in terms of
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years, months, and days” (Baiamonte 1969, 45). The Election Law of 1896 was an
obvious attempt by the Democratic Party “disfranchise many Negroes” (Baiamonte 1969,
45). Since the wording of the 1896 law meant that many whites were also disfranchised,
the convention two years later, in 1898, aimed to “enfranchise propertyless [sic] and
illiterate whites” (Baiamonte 1969, 45). Therefore, the following amendment was added
which provided that:
No male of foreign birth, who was naturalized prior to the first day of January
1898, should be denied the right to register and vote…by reason of his failure to
possess the educational or property qualification…’ (Louisiana Constitution 1898,
Art. 197, Sec. 5, 227)
The convention also passed the provision that allowed “illiterate and propertyless
[sic] whites to vote if their grandfather or father had voted prior to January 1, 1867”
(Baiamonte 1969, 46). This blatant favoritism for literate foreigners over illiterate
natives angered many people and set the native New Orleanians, both white and black,
against the Sicilian immigrants. Delegates from the black parishes argued against what
they called the “grandfather-father clause” (Baiamonte 1969, 46; Cunningham 1969, 34).
Despite this attempt to gain white solidarity through the emancipation of naturalized
immigrants, it soon became obvious to the convention that Sicilians [Italians] were “the
real problem” (Baiamonte 1969, 47; Cunningham 1965, 34). The immigrants did not
have the same mind-set as native whites. They did not support the suppression of their
black neighbors and this unwillingness to support white solidarity, along with their lack
of prejudice against blacks, made them a target for racial discrimination.
Discrimination, prejudice, and violence. The Sicilians in Louisiana began to
experience the same kind of discrimination and violence that blacks had endured for
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decades. According to Baiamonte, the southern Italians and Sicilians “were subjected to
the most severe treatment” of all the immigrant groups (Baiamonte 1969, 79). Many in
the South viewed the southern Italians and Sicilians as just as black as any former slave.
Evidence of this can be found in records of the day. For example, in 1906 Luigi Villari,
an Italian diplomat, toured the area and had this to say:
The Italian is neither loved nor respected in the southern states. He is desired as a
useful and exploitable instrument of labor, but personally he is considered a sort
of white-skinned negro [sic] who is a better worker than the black-skinned negro
[sic]. (Villari as cited by Edwards-Simpson 1996, 1)
However, the Sicilians did not behave in expected ways. For one thing, they were very
independent and driven to succeed, and Americans, both white and black, began to resent
them. Baiamonte phrased this way:
The ‘Americans’ thought that they could handle the Negroes and keep them
subservient. But, this was not true with the Italians and this was what angered the
native whites. The Italians did work that only Negroes would do, but through
thrift they managed to save their money. Even though the Italians did ‘nigger
work,’ they would not allow themselves to be treated like the southern Negroes.
When called ‘dagoes,’ they would fight. If they were shot at, they returned their
fire. The Italians resisted any attempt to keep them in a lowly position, socially or
economically (Baiamonte 1969, 95)
In 1891, one of the most hate-filled, mob-led executions in the history of the
South was perpetrated against Sicilian immigrants in New Orleans, a culmination of
events that stemmed from the murder of the local police chief some months prior. On
October 15, 1890, then police chief David C. Hennessy was shot outside his home. His
murder was believed to have been a Mafia hit in retaliation for his involvement in the
arrests of two Mafia members. Several Sicilians were rounded up and questioned.
Despite damning testimony, the defendants were acquitted due to lack of evidence. The
jury’s decision enflamed the public and sparked the rage of thousands of New Orleanians.
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On March 14,1891, a mob of angry citizens estimated at over five-thousand (Gauthreaux
2014, 13), led by prominent community leaders, stormed the prison and forced their way
inside. Leaders of the mob forced their way in, hunted down the Sicilians and began to
slaughter them. A graphic description is provided below:
The mob arrived at the Parish Prison at 10:20. They demanded entrance and were
denied it. Avoiding the locked gate, they sawed down a telegraph pole and used it
as a battering ram on a wooden door located on a side-street. They thereby gained
access to the prison complex through the warden’s on-site apartment. By 10:30 a
group of twenty-five to thirty armed leaders of the vigilante mob entered the
prison. The crowd tried to surge in, but Wickliffe told them that “cool action” was
needed and they stayed back. The prison deputies were overwhelmed by the
armed band and provided keys to any locked doors in the prison complex. The
self-appointed avengers then broke into small groups in search of their prey.
(Kendall 1939, 492-530 as cited by Edwards-Simpson 1996, 115)
Newspapers across the nation were on both sides of the issue, some condemning
the lynching, others praising it. For example, The Nashville American described the
lynching as “‘one of bloodiest and most brutal butcheries on record’” (The Nashville
American n. d. as cited by Baiamonte 1969, 82). While the Times-Democrat asserted that
“Desperate diseases require desperate remedies…Our justification was – necessity; our
defense is – self-preservation, nature’s primal law” (Times-Democrat n. d. as cited by
Baiamonte 1969, 82). It is evident from these two examples that the nation was divided
into two sides of the issue; one condemning the lynching, another praising it.
Unfortunately, the incident in 1891 was not an isolated one. Between the years
1886 and 1910, 42 Italians were lynched across several southern states including
Louisiana, West Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, Florida and Mississippi (Durso
2012, 66). Despite the dangers, however, southern Italians and Sicilians continued
flocking to the state in response to the need for labor (Durso 2012, 66).
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Connections
As this section indicated, several factors contributed to the immigration of Sicilian
peasants. The economic conditions in Louisiana created a need for laborers while the
economic conditions in Sicily created a need for work. It was fairly simple to connect the
two. Nothing was simple however about the conditions under which the Sicilians lived
once they arrived in the state. The racial tensions of the times placed the Sicilians in
between two rival factions of the public, and the fact that they did not hold the same
racial views as native Southerners of the time made their place in society questionable.
This racial categorization and the social imbalances of the times set the stage for the
Sicilian community’s ethnic identity evolution to come. However, it would take involved
processes throughout some years before those conditions improved. Furthermore, those
conditions took a drastic turn for the worse in 1905 when Yellow Jack came on the scene.
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CHAPTER V – ENTER YELLOW JACK
“…a fearsome disease, characterized by high fever, chills, purplish bruises,
jaundice, and vomiting of black, blood-filled bile lasting a week to 10 days” (Abrams
2015, 51).

Figure 3. Cartoon depicting the arrival of yellow fever to New York City, 1883.
Source: Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, September 21, 1883 as cited by Fee and Fox 1988, 184.

Overview
Historically, yellow fever has had many names, each with its own fearful
connotation. Augustin’s encyclopedic work on the history of yellow fever provides over
150 pseudonyms (Augustin 1909, 84). It has been called the yellow plague, the saffron
scourge, the visitor, the stranger’s disease, and the invader (Carrigan 1959, 1963, 1970;
Engineer 2010; The Great Fever 2006; Humphreys 1992; Pain 2000; Patterson 1992;
Pritchett and Tunali 1995). Its Spanish names, “vomito negro and vomito prieto,
(Engineer 2010, 5-6; Humphreys 1992, 6) translate as one of its symptoms, “the black
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vomit” (Carrigan 1959, 339; Carrigan 1963, 5). However, Yellow Jack is the most
apropós name for the New Orleans 1905 epidemic as it was believed that the disease was
imported by a sailor or passenger onboard one of the incoming ships, a direct correlation
to the importation theory listed below. This appellation for the disease had been known
prior to 1905, as shown in Figure 3. Originally printed on September 21, 1883, the image
of a skeletal sailor bringing Yellow Fever into New York can just as easily apply to 1905
New Orleans. It quite appropriately represents how people viewed yellow fever, namely,
that it was a frightening, deadly disease brought by sailors aboard ships arriving at ports
like New Orleans. These fearful images of the disease, coupled with Sicilians’ fear of
authority figures helped to fuel their resistance to sanitation efforts.
To develop an understanding of how the Sicilian community would have viewed
yellow fever and how the 1905 epidemic affected them requires an examination of the
history of the disease. The following paragraphs discuss previous outbreaks of yellow
fever, its impact in the number of deaths, and various early theories about the disease.
These sources provide the basis for later argument in this thesis: that the yellow fever’s
presence influenced the Sicilian community’s actions in 1905. The last section details the
accomplishments of the Reed Commission that proved the mosquito connection in the
transmission of yellow fever, a pivotal scientific breakthrough that led to the eradication
of the 1905 yellow fever epidemic through the efforts of the United States Marine
Hospital.
History of Yellow Fever
Much has been written about the spread of yellow fever in America, it’s
devastating impact, and how it was finally eradicated. Outbreaks of the disease were
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recorded in 1649 [Spanish Florida], 1668 [New York], 1691 [Boston], 1693
[Philadelphia], and 1699 [Charleston] (Abrams 2015; Fossier 1942, 320; Patterson,
2004). Even New Orleans had prior experience with the disease in 1796 when it was
called the yellow plague (Fossier 1942, 322). Philadelphia would experience another
yellow fever epidemic in 1793 (Abrams 2015). Weather played a part in the severity of
the epidemic; a wet spring followed by a hot summer provided ideal breeding conditions
for mosquitoes; the unknown carrier of the disease (Abrams 2015, 50). All that is needed
is the vector; this occurs when an infected person gets bitten by mosquitoes that then bite
healthy individuals, who then contract the disease. The 1793 epidemic was attributed to
the arrival of a small group of infected travelers on ships coming from tropical locations
(Abrams 2015, 51). Forty percent of the total population of the city would flee; 10% of
whom would die in only four months’ time (Abrams 2015, 50).
Fear of the disease was driven by the fact that no one understood how the disease
was transmitted (Abrams 2015, 50). Some blamed the epidemic on Frenchmen who had
traveled through Haiti in their flight from the French Revolution (Abrams 2015, 55).
Others believed that miasmas, or bad air, that emanated from the ground brought on the
epidemic (Abrams 2015, 55). The mosquito connection would not be discovered for
more than 100 years. Those victims who were healthy and strong prior to contracting the
disease, and had access to good care, stood a better chance of survival (Abrams 2015,
51). Those with pre-existing conditions that lived in over-crowded, unsanitary homes,
and subsisted on poor, insufficient diets, were the most susceptible (Abrams 2015, 51).
Ten to sixty percent of those infected in the city that year died (Abrams 2015, 51). The
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epidemic peaked in August and only November’s lower temperatures stopped its spread
(Abrams 2015, 50).
This was the typical scenario when yellow fever struck, first some few victims
were infected, then a few more and the number grew until panic ensued and people began
to flee sometimes taking the disease with them. It was an event that would occur again,
and again. Philadelphia endured another round with yellow fever in 1798 that killed
5,000, New Orleans met the disease in 1853 when it killed 8,000, Norfolk lost 2,000 lives
in 1855, and the Mississippi Valley was devastated by the disease in 1878 when it took a
staggering 20,000 lives from New Orleans to Memphis (Abrams 2015, 53). These facts
were well known in 1905, and especially in New Orleans. Only 27 years had passed
since the 1878 epidemic, which was recent enough for locals to still remember, and
stories would have been told, igniting fears across the city that even the newly arrived
immigrants would sense.
Early Theories about Yellow Fever
Two early beliefs about the disease were closely linked in theory, the belief that
the disease was imported and the idea that the yellow fever ‘germ’ could be transmitted
via personal contact (Carpenter 1844, 32; LalDAnnual 1934, 1). The Importation Theory
and, consequentially, the Personal Contact Theory, were proposed as early as 1793
(Carpenter 1844, 32). Scientists and doctors agreed that the disease was an imported
infection, carried into the country via fomites, or clothing and other contaminated items,
by infected travelers or sailors onboard incoming ships (Carpenter 1844, 32). This
naturally led to the Personal Contact Theory; the belief that healthy individuals who then
come into contact with infected persons or things are susceptible to the disease
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(Carpenter 1844, 32). Efforts were then made to prevent travelers and sailors from
bringing “ship fever” into the cities (Carpenter 1844, 32). The trade connection between
the United States and places like the Caribbean, where yellow fever was endemic, fed the
importation theory and led to belief that the institution of quarantine laws would be an
effective measure in preventing yellow fever outbreaks (LalDAnnual 1934, 1).
Another transmission theory called the Miasma Theory was proposed by Drs.
Benjamin Rush and Noah Webster in the 1790s (LalDAnnual 1934, 1). They argued that
yellow fever came from the “local miasmas” arising from dead plants and animals as they
decayed in the hot, humid weather (LalDAnnual 1934, 1).
Epidemiology of the Disease
Today, scientists know that yellow fever occurs naturally in Africa and South
America; however, it travels wherever the mosquito goes; being transmitted from one
infected person to another (Barnett 2007; Carrigan 1963, 1970, 1988; Carrol 1905; Finlay
1903; Guiteras 1905; Humphreys 1992; Kohnke 1906; LalDAnnual 1934). In 1905, as
mentioned earlier, New Orleans was connected to South America, Haiti, and Cuba, where
yellow fever was endemic (LalDAnnual 1934, 1). It was only a matter of time before
infected individuals would board a ship bound for New Orleans to start another outbreak.
New incoming Sicilian immigrants would not necessarily have known much
about yellow fever, its transmission or its prevention. For them, it would have been just
another thing to fear. These fears were not unfounded. Even if one survived the illness,
the symptoms were terrifying: headache, high fever, jaundice, internal and external
bleeding, nausea, and worst of all, black vomit (Abrams 2015; Barnett 2007; Bryan et al.
2004, 275; Center for Disease Control n. d.; The Great Fever 2006; Humphreys 1992;
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LalDAnnual 1934; Mayo Clinic n. d.; Pain 2000; Patterson 1992; Pritchett and Tunali,
1995). Other symptoms include back pain, bruising, and chills (Abrams 2015, 50; Bryan
et al. 2004, 275; The Great Fever 2006; Mayo Clinic n. d.). As the disease progresses it
causes heart, liver, and kidney problems (Bryan et al. 2004, 275; Mayo Clinic n. d.).
Abrams (2015) describes it as “a fearsome disease, characterized by high fever, chills,
purplish bruises, jaundice and vomiting of black, blood-filled bile lasting a week to 10
days” (Abrams 2015, 50). Symptoms can begin three to six days after contracting the
disease from an infected mosquito and can then progress to the toxic phase, coma and
death (Bryan et al. 2004, 275; Center for Disease Control n. d.; The Great Fever 2006;
Humphreys 1992; LalDAnnual, 1934; Mayo Clinic n. d.; Pain 2000; Patterson 1992;
Pritchett and Tunali, 1995). Death can occur in a little as a week (Humphreys 1992, 6).
It is no surprise that the people of New Orleans, citizens and immigrants alike, were
afraid.
The Reed Commission
The discovery that mosquitoes carried the disease would have an important
impact on the 1905 epidemic in New Orleans. Cuba would prove to be the place where
the final pieces of the puzzle would be put together.
In 1872, Dr. Carlos Finlay of Havana, Cuba began to study yellow fever (Gorgas
1905; The Great Fever 2006; Kelly 1906; Lafayette Advertiser 1905b; Warren 1951). He
studied changes in temperature, altitude, and alkalinity of the atmosphere in his attempts
to isolate the cause (The Great Fever 2006; Kelly 1906). Then, in 1879, an American
scientist sent Finlay a set of photos of slides containing tissue from victims of yellow
fever (The Great Fever 2006; Kelly 1906). These slides led him to believe that yellow
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fever was transmitted through “lesions in the blood vessels” (The Great Fever 2006;
Kelly 1906). He concluded that only a biting insect could cause these lesions and began
to research how. In a spark of genius, Dr. Finlay thought to map out where the various
species of mosquitoes were to be found, as well as the locations of yellow fever
outbreaks. He found that the two maps matched perfectly (The Great Fever 2006; Kelly
1906). On August 18, 1881, he presented his findings at the International Scientific
Conference in Havana, unfortunately, no one accepted his theory (Gorgas 1905; The
Great Fever 2006; Kelly 1906). It would be nearly twenty years before someone reexamined Finlay’s work (Warren 1951; Kelly 1906).
In July of 1900, an outbreak of yellow fever in Cuba prompted the United States
Surgeon General George Sternberg to appoint Major Walter Reed to oversee
investigations into a solution (Gorgas 1905; The Great Fever 2006; Kelly 1906; Lafayette
Advertiser 1905b; The Rice Belt Journal 1905a). Major Walter Reed and his assistants,
Drs. James Carroll and Jesse Lazear, traveled to Cuba and began their studies, however,
they were unsuccessful and eventually consulted Dr. Carlos Finlay (Boyce, 1906, 6; The
Great Fever 2006). Finlay’s work in 1881 and Ross and Carter’s discovery of the
connection between mosquitoes and malaria influenced the team’s own work on yellow
fever (Finlay 1903, 2; Boyce 1906, 6). It was now much more believable that mosquitoes
could be the link to yellow fever that had eluded researchers for so long.
Finlay explained his theory, and provided Reed’s team with mosquito eggs so the
experiments could begin (Gorgas 1905; The Great Fever 2006; The Rice Belt Journal
1905a). A breakthrough was not long in coming as Major Reed returned to Washington
and left his two colleagues working. Dr. Lazear started his own experiments after Reed’s
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departure which would prove both groundbreaking and tragic. With mosquitoes obtained
from the rooms of known cases of yellow fever, he tried to inoculate (infect) volunteers
as well as himself, but to no avail. On August 27, Lazear noticed one mosquito seemed
in need of blood and “fearing it would die, asked his colleague Carroll if he would allow
it to feed” (The Great Fever 2006). Carroll did so and two days later he became ill (The
Great Fever 2006). Using the same mosquito, Lazear asked young soldier named Dean if
he would allow himself to be bitten; he also developed yellow fever. Fortunately, these
two brave volunteers recovered, but the same would not be said for Lazear. Without
telling anyone, Lazear allowed himself to be bitten by the same mosquito (The Great
Fever 2006). On September 18, Dr. Lazear was taken to the hospital where he later died
(The Great Fever 2006). It was his sacrifice, however unintended, that finally gave the
scientists the evidence needed to prove the mosquito theory of transmission of the yellow
fever virus (The Great Fever 2006). Lazear’s death led to the team’s full acceptance of
the mosquito connection to the transmission of yellow fever.
Major Reed returned to Cuba, now convinced of the mosquito connection (The
Great Fever 2006). He studied Lazear’s notes, made his case before the Army Medical
Board, and got permission to set up a scientific experiment (The Great Fever 2006).
Major Reed set up a camp (named Camp Lazear) and built two one-room cabins (Gorgas
1905; The Great Fever 2006; Lafayette Advertiser 1905b; The Rice Belt Journal. 1905a).
Cabin One contained bedding and belongings of yellow fever patients, while Cabin Two
was divided by a mosquito-proof screen (Gorgas 1905; The Great Fever 2006; Lafayette
Advertiser 1905b). One side of Cabin number two housed volunteers and no mosquitoes,
while the other side of Cabin number one held volunteers and inoculated (infected)
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mosquitoes (Gorgas 1905; The Great Fever 2006; Lafayette Advertiser 1905b). The
results were definitive. Only those in the room with mosquitoes contracted yellow fever
(Gorgas 1905; The Great Fever 2006; Lafayette Advertiser 1905b). They had finally
connected the dots. The results convinced Chief Sanitation Officer Major William
Gorges to order troops throughout Havana to go to each infected home, screen in the
infected person, and fumigate to kill the mosquitoes. It was a huge success. “In 1900
there had been 300 yellow fever deaths; in 1901 there was only one” (The Great Fever
2006). Still, even with this evidence, Major Reed had trouble convincing health officials
in Washington to control the mosquitoes. Unfortunately, he would not be the one to do
so; Major Reed died in 1902 from complications from appendicitis (The Great Fever
2006). It would be left to Dr. Carroll to present the stringent preventive measures which,
had they been in practice in New Orleans prior to the epidemic in 1905, would have
greatly curtailed the yellow fever outbreak, and perhaps, spared lives both in the Sicilian
community and the city at large (Carroll 1905, 274). A copy of Carroll’s list appears in
Appendix A.
Today, yellow fever is defined as a viral infection or hemorrhagic fever spread
through the bite of the female mosquito of the species Aedes aegypti (Augustin 1909;
Barnett 2007, 850; Bryan et al. 2004, 275; Finlay 1903; The Great Fever 2006;
Humphreys 1992; Mayo Clinic n. d.; Patterson 1992). In 1905, the fact that mosquitoes
carried yellow fever was still relatively unknown among the public, and Sicilian
immigrants were especially ignorant of this fact. For many, the disease was a plague
visited upon them from unknown or nefarious origins, its very name a source of fear.
Connections
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The history of yellow fever in the United States is a vital part of the story of the
1905 yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans. Through understanding how past epidemics
were viewed and managed, one can better imagine the terrifying effect it had on the
Sicilian immigrants. Further, having a basic knowledge about the mosquito connection to
the disease enlightens one to the importance of the steps taken by city officials and
Marine doctors during the epidemic. The connection of the epidemic to the Sicilian
population is discussed further in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER VI – FROM DAGO TO WHITE
“I remember one day, my father refused to have any other papers except
American papers, newspapers. He was going to learn English and he refused to have
any Italian papers in the house” (Marianne Riga as cited by Coan 1997, 67).

Overview
Many factors and traumatic events influenced Sicilian immigrants’ ethnic
transformation from dago to white. These factors and events fueled the racial and ethnic
categorization and assimilation of Sicilians into American society. These factors and
events, poised against the backdrop of the yellow fever epidemic, reveal the processes
that influenced change within the Sicilian community. What follows below discusses the
racial and ethnic ambiguity faced by the Sicilian community, their place in New Orleans,
in both a physical and social sense, the events of the 1905 yellow fever epidemic, and its
connection to the evolution of Sicilian ethnic identity.
Dago, Negro, or White?
The Sicilian community came from a country that was, in a broad sense,
homogenous in ethnicity. When they arrived in Louisiana, they found that the nativeborn population was “stratified along racial lines” (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 2). Their
willingness to do the same work as the black community placed them at the same low
status and limited residential and occupational opportunities (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 2).
This led native New Orleanians to categorize them as racially inferior to other whites
(Edwards-Simpson 1996, 2), or as Gauthreaux described it, as “negroes with white skin”
(Gauthreaux 2014, 14). This racial image of the Sicilian immigrant was no doubt
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partially influenced by the publications of the era. For example, both the TimesDemocrat and the Franklin News published the following statement:
The political bosses of New Orleans want to make the Dagoes citizens and
disfranchise the Negro, and God knows if there is any difference between them it
is largely in the darkies’ favor, if we may judge the quality now being imported
here as plantation laborers (quoted in the Times-Democrat 1898 as cited by
Cunningham 1965, 34).
It is impossible to know how many people shared the belief that Sicilians were less
“favorable” than blacks in quality, but certainly any negative publicity did not help how
they were perceived. It also would not have endeared them to the black community, as
such comments were not actually praising them either.
Another paper, The Homer Clipper, was even more harsh in their assessment of
the Sicilian and Italian population:
They are corrupt and purchasable and according to the spirit of our meaning when
we speak of white man’s government, they are black as the blackest Negro in
existence (quoted in the Times-Democrat 1898 as cited by Cunningham, 1965,
34)
These disparaging remarks, having been published for all educated people to read, surely
encouraged more prejudice and violence against the immigrant population. The lynching
of Sicilians during the dispute over the disenfranchisement of native blacks taught them a
painful lesson. According to Cunningham:
They had better adopt the customs, prejudices, and way of life of white
Louisianans as soon as possible. They must look with loathing upon everything
that the native whites loathed. Once they did so, the Italians could gain
acceptance among the native whites, though not at first on a basis of complete
equality (Cunningham 1965, 35-36)
Their reputation was being tarnished by what their association with, and their lack
of prejudice against blacks, as well as their perceived association with the Mafia.
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Sicilians were perceived as dishonest, racially inferior people living on an inferior social
level (Durso 2012, 39). This negative image was a dishonorable state in which to live.
For Sicilians, family honor was very important (Edwards-Simpson 1996; Durso 2012).
When they realized this honor was being threatened by their “lack of Jim Crow
prejudice” (Edwards-Simpson 1996, iv), they began to change their views (Durso 2012,
39).
Little Palermo
Sicilian immigrants came into the United States without knowledge of the racial,
ethnic, and social divisions they would experience or the prejudicial attitudes that would
marginalize them as dagoes. This marginalization began almost the moment they stepped
off the ships. It is evidenced in the way they congregated in little ethnic conclaves set
within larger cities like New York or Philadelphia. Those who migrated to New Orleans
behaved no differently when it came to community. They built their own village within
the larger surrounds of the city, further setting themselves apart. Many of the Sicilian
immigrants to Louisiana either migrated to New Orleans from their work on the
plantations or New Orleans was their original destination. Some of those who
immigrated to New Orleans were wives and children of men who worked the plantations
while they resided in the city. Others, as mentioned earlier, worked on the docks. These
families settled in the oldest, cheapest, part of the city, giving it a new name, Little
Palermo.
Little Palermo was situated in the Vieux Carré, also called the French Quarter
(Edwards-Simpson 1996, 51). The French Quarter is a ten by thirteen block district
bounded by the Mississippi River, Canal Street, Rampart Street, and Esplanade Avenue
58

(Edwards-Simpson 1996, 51). It is a collection of planned streets, buildings, and open
spaces that has an air of times past to residents and visitors alike. The aerial view of the
French Market depicted in Figure 4 gives a sense what the area would have looked like
during the time.

Figure 4. Aerial view of the French Quarter, ca. 1851.
Source: Library of Congress; Bachmann, John, 1851.

The Sicilian area was like a tiny village situated within the heart of the city. It
served as a natural extension of life as it had been lived in the old world. Families lived
together in cramped spaces, continued the same cultural traditions and assisted
newcomers as they arrived. The men worked in the city, or on outlying plantations as
discussed above. In the city, men were dock workers, fruit peddlers, and sometimes
owners of their own ethnic grocery stores, or restaurants (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 51).
They stayed connected through community and familial bonds and formed several ethnic
beneficent societies, generally named after their home villages (Margavio and Salomone
1981, 349). These societies served as support resources for themselves as well as for
newcomers (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 51; Margavio and Salomone 1981, 349).
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The social hierarchy in the communities that surrounded Little Palermo was more
diverse and consisted of people of various origins including those of Creole, Anglo,
African-American, Irish, German and mainland Italian ethnicity (Edwards-Simpson
1996, 9). The mainland [non-Sicilian] Italians included educated diplomats, priests, and
nuns, who were sometimes supportive of Sicilian immigrants, and sometimes not
(Edwards-Simpson 1996, 9). It is possible that the ethnic diversity of the surrounding
city blocks facilitated the ethnic evolution of the Sicilian community over time through
reciprocal associations and interactions.
Even though most Italian immigrants were in fact Sicilian, most New Orleans
residents called them all “Italians” or “Dagoes” (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 10). Some
believe the term “Dagoes”, used to disparage those of Italian, Spanish, or Portuguese
descent, developed from the Spanish name Diego (Times-Picayune 1898). Others claim
it came from the practice of the Sicilians working “by the day”, so-called “day goers”,
and developed from Sicilian traditions or habits, such as described by Di Palma
Castiglione, “…the peasants walk morning and night several miles to and from the fields.
They leave their homes long before dawn and return after sunset” (Di Palma Castiglione
1905, 203). In either case, the term “dago” was as insulting to Sicilians, as the word
“negro” was, and still is, to African Americans, today.
Still the question remains as to how Sicilians saw themselves. Luconi (2004)
argued that Sicilians and Italians did not have a sense of their own ethnic identity until
they came to America (Luconi 2004, 162). This argument is based on the homogeneity
of their homeland. Everyone was from Italy. Everyone was from Sicily. Only in
America did the “view of being Italian”, of being different, become starkly apparent
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(Luconi 2004, 162). It can be argued that immigrants felt a strong need to become
Americanized as soon as possible. An example taken from the book, Ellis Island
Interviews (Coan 1997) makes this quite apparent:
I remember one day, my father refused to have any other papers except American
papers, newspapers. He was going to learn English and he refused to have any
Italian papers in the house (quote from Marianne Riga as cited by Coan 1997, 67)
Here is an example of immigrants making a conscious choice to become part of
American society. The father’s declaration clearly had an impact on the child,
reinforcing the notion that learning English was an important step in adjusting to their
new lives as U. S. citizens. His refusal to even have Italian newspapers in the home
indicates his choice to shed a vital part of his ethnic heritage, his language. Furthermore,
his actions impacted not only his own behavior, but that of his family members as well.
In another example, Mario Vina, who immigrated in 1909, relates what happened
when his father met them in New York:
Then we went to Middletown by train and when we got there he had a present for
me. A baseball bat and a glove, which I had never seen before. ‘What are these
for?’ I asked him. “You play with these,” he said. “It’s a game. It’s called
baseball.” (quote from Mario Vina as cited by Coan 1997, 40)
It seems that even in 1909, America’s national game was baseball, and by giving his son
this gift, he was giving him a means to interact with American boys, to fit in and become
American himself. These two stories illustrate that immigrants felt the desire to adopt
American ways as soon as possible.
Still, Sicilian immigrants faced unique obstacles in the southern states when it
came to the issue of race. As has been discussed earlier, the Sicilians became caught up
in the race war between whites and blacks. With their dark complexions, and lack of
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prejudice towards blacks, they soon found themselves classified somewhere in between
the two. This realization of difference amidst the horror of the yellow fever epidemic,
influenced New Orleans Sicilians to move toward whiteness, as well as assimilation into
American society.
The 1905 Yellow Fever Epidemic
The sub-tropical climate of New Orleans is hot and humid, which allows for the
growth of tropical flora such as “sugar cane, bananas, bougainvillea, hibiscus, and
passion fruit” (Engineer 2010, 1-2). Unfortunately, its climate also made it a perfect
breeding ground for the mosquito, and its bustling port brought in hundreds of visitors
from far away ports where yellow fever was endemic. Add several hundred new
immigrants and visitors without immunity to yellow fever and it is have the perfect
setting for an outbreak. All that is needed is one person infected with the disease to
encounter the local mosquitoes, which then carry the disease to residents across the city.
In 1905, the New Orleans Port welcomed ships from various cities in Mexico,
Cuba, and Central America (Boyce 1906, 2). It is not surprising that passengers or crew
members may have arrived in New Orleans infected with the disease. It is also known
that infected mosquitoes have been found within the ships, having survived in water
stored onboard ship. Boyce relates incidents from 1902:
Dr. Souchon instituted an examination of the fruit vessels during the quarantine
season of 1902, and as a result found that out of 12 vessels making 180 trips
between New Orleans and Central American ports, the Stegomyia fasciata was
present 5 times and on vessels running between Havana and New Orleans 10
times (Boyce 1906, 3)
It is interesting to note that the ships themselves could have brought the Stegomyia
fasciata mosquitoes into the city, which then carried the disease from infected sailors to
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workers on the docks. There is a clear link between those infected sailors to the skeletal
image of Yellow Jack as a bearer of the disease.
As of the year 1905, New Orleans, known as the “Necropolis of the South”
(Carrigan 1963, 7) due to its death rate having exceeded its birth rate, had not had an
outbreak of yellow fever since 1878. Health officials would not have the knowledge to
combat the disease until Walter Reed’s commission “clearly demonstrated the role of the
Aedes aegypti mosquito in transmitting yellow fever” (Carrigan 1988, 5). However even
after Reed’s discovery and the formulation of a committee to map out mosquito breeding
grounds in the city in 1901 by the New Orleans Parish Medical Society (Boyce 1906, 10),
the Board of Health’s attempts to begin an “anti-mosquito campaign” failed to generate
support from residents and government officials until yellow fever once again made its
presence known in 1905 (Carrigan 1988, 5). However, the New Orleans Parish Medical
Society did form a committee to map out mosquito breeding grounds in the city in 1901
(Boyce 1906:10). This map (Figure 5) would prove highly useful in 1905 sanitation
efforts.
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Figure 5. 1906 Map depicting the distribution of Mosquitoes in New Orleans.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 10.

The population of New Orleans in 1905 was approximately 325,000 (Boyce 1906,
3-4; Carrigan 1988, 5) and “less than one-fourth” were immune, which left most of the
residents susceptible to the disease (Carrigan 1988, 5). To combat an epidemic in the city
would prove to be a monumental task, requiring co-operation between city officials,
governmental agencies, the clergy, and citizens of all ethnicities and social standing. It
was the first time that city officials attempted to combat the disease through eradication
of the mosquito and would prove to be a turning point in the way that government entities
would combat environmental threats to public health (Boyce 1906; Carrigan 1988;
Engineer 2010; Fossier 1942; Pain 2000; Pritchett and Tunali 1995; and Warren 1951).
No one knows when the first person, or persons, became infected with the dread
disease. Anyone from any of the ships coming into the city, both legally and illegally,
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could have been infected. As Boyce put it, “the possibility of a sailor or passenger
eluding vigilance early in the year and reaching New Orleans and infecting the Stegomyia
in the City cannot be altogether excluded” (Boyce 1906, 2). Furthermore, conditions in
the city were ideal in the spring of 1905 for breeding Stegomyia fasciata. According
Boyce, the city was “ripe for an epidemic”:
The essential factors were at hand to favour [sic] an outbreak (Boyce 1906, 5).
[The]…paving of the roads…allowed of the formation of numerous pools after
rain…an open drain on each side of the roadway contained…slowly moving or
stagnant water…No proper drainage existed in the yards, the closets were very
dilapidated, and were constructed on the cess pit [sic] or pail system…every yard
contained one or more unprotected water receptacles which gave rise to immense
numbers of the Stegomyia fasciata… (Boyce 1906, 4)
The presence of standing water and the conditions of the cisterns provided all that
was needed for the mosquitoes to breed. It is not certain where the mosquitoes first
spawned, or from whom the yellow fever first originated. What is certain is that on July
12, 1905, “two very suspicious cases” in the Sicilian quarters were quietly reported
(Boyce 1906, 51). Dr. Quitman Kohnke investigated the two cases and found the disease
“in spots…over an area of about five squares” (Kohnke as cited by Boyce 1906, 17). He
also found that the history of infection had “dated back several weeks” and had not been
“recognized by patients, and attending physicians” (Kohnke as cited by Boyce 1906, 17).
Kohnke’s observation then, supports the idea that by that time “the disease had a firm
hold” in Little Palermo, and probably had been present since “sometime in May”
(Carrigan 1988:6), possibly “as early as May 13” (Boyce 1905, 17). It was also supposed
that the disease had been imported to the city from Central America (Carrigan 1988:6).
By July 22, when the official announcement was made, there were approximately 100
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cases of sickness that had already resulted in twenty deaths (Boyce 1906, 17; Carrigan
1988; The Great Fever 2006).
Most of the Sicilians were recent arrivals who did not speak English, and were
unfamiliar with yellow fever. The immigrants’ distrust of authority figures when added
with their cultural traditions made them unlikely to seek medical assistance (Boyce 1906,
4; Carrigan 1988). According to Boyce, “The whole neighborhood [was] overcrowded,
foreign, insanitary, and superstitious” (Boyce 1906, 5). Figure 6 provides a look at the
inner courtyard of an immigrant’s home in 1905.

Figure 6. Photograph of a home in Little Palermo, ca. 1905.
Source: McMain 1905, 153.

Further, as it would be later discovered, “the fever centred [sic] amongst the
Italians” (Boyce 1906, 5). Thus, most of the cases and subsequent deaths were amongst
the Sicilians and Italians. The most likely reason for the high number of Sicilian and
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Italian deaths was that many of the men worked on the docks unloading fruit from the
cargo ships. These jobs brought them into contact with likely carriers of the disease. To
get a sense of the scope of the impact of the epidemic, the map in Figure 7 depicts the
locations of yellow fever deaths.

Figure 7. Map of the Infected Block in the Italian Quarter in New Orleans in 1905.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 5.

The area with the highest concentration of dots represents the highest number of
deaths. As can be seen, the highest number of yellow fever deaths occurred within the
French Quarter; i.e., “Little Italy” (Boyce 1906) also known as “Little Palermo”
(Carrigan 1988; Edwards-Simpson 1996).
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Dr. Kohnke urged the city to institute a program of mosquito control; however,
the threat of a yellow fever outbreak was not taken seriously (St. Tammany Farmer 1905;
Times-Picayune 1905d). In March 1905, Dr. Kohnke began to give lectures at Tulane to
urge the abolition of cisterns. He demonstrated how copper sulphate [sic] could not kill
mosquitoes, but that “by putting a few drops of oil on the water”, the mosquitoes died for
lack of oxygen (Kohnke 1906, 89-94; St. Tammany Farmer 1905; Times-Picayune
1905d). He explained that Stegomyia mosquitoes carried both malaria and yellow fever,
and that swamps, stagnant water and cisterns were the perfect breeding grounds (TimesPicayune 1905d). He argued that by ridding the city of the mosquito, they would
eliminate the need for the quarantines that hindered the “free exercise of trade” (TimesPicayune 1905d). To do this, he argued, meant the destruction of the city’s cisterns; “the
most important sanitary measure of the day” (Times-Picayune 1905d). However, the
cisterns in 1905 New Orleans were vital as they were main source of drinking water
(Augustin 1909, 1038). While destroying the cisterns, and any other possible standing
water, would be the ideal way to eliminate the mosquito problem, it was not a realistic
option at the time. Other methods would have to be pursued. George Augustin explains
his first-hand knowledge of the methods used as follows:
…it was decided that the first thing to be done…was to make our cisterns
impossible to the Stegomyiae as breeding places. To do this…it would be
necessary to oil them (pour upon the surface of the water a small quantity of coal
oil) and next to cover their tops in such a way that no opening larger than onesixteenth of inch square should remain unclosed. Secondly, that all premises
should be frequently inspected and all standing water poured out, drained away or
oiled, and all cesspool, and privy vaults cleansed and oiled not less than once a
week (Augustin 1909, 1028)
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Early actions by the public most likely assisted in slowing the spread of the 1905
yellow fever epidemic. While it is not measurable as such, one can argue the point due to
the final number of deaths in the 1905 epidemic as compared to the total death count
from the disease in 1898. A comparison of these numbers is discussed in later sections of
this work. What follows in the next sections are images of the city during the epidemic
of 1905. These provide a vivid look at the types of standing water present and show the
actual work that was done to rid the city of the dreaded mosquitoes. Photographs of the
cisterns, open drains, and the work crews are found in Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11.

Figure 8. Home with Water Cistern in New Orleans, 1905.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 11.
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Figure 9. Street Gutter in New Orleans, 1905.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 9.

Figure 10. Steam Fumigation in New Orleans, 1905.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 46.
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Figure 11. “Oiling Gang” Responsible for placing oil in cisterns in New Orleans, 1905.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 47.

Even before the official notice of yellow fever, quarantines were initiated by
Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi against persons and baggage from New Orleans. No
passengers would be allowed to disembark any trains in those states though through fares
and freight would be allowed (Times-Picayune 1905f). According to Boyce, the State
and City Boards of Health, along with the Public Health and Marine Hospital Services,
and various state Health Officers, met on Friday, July 21, to make an official declaration
to reassure the public and “to check the stringent and onerous quarantine precautions
which had, on the rumours [sic] of the presence of Yellow Fever, been promptly taken by
the surrounding States [such as Mississippi] against New Orleans” even though an
official declaration had not yet been made (Boyce 1906, 18). The city of Lafayette also
put a quarantine into effect against New Orleans and officials were charged to guard
transports coming into the town, allowing no “passengers with or without baggage” to be
admitted, and only merchandise certified by the U. S. Marine Hospital Service as
fumigated would be admitted (Lafayette Advertiser 1905d).
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On July 22nd, an Advisory Board was appointed to work with health authorities;
members included Chairman Dr. Le Boeuf and three other members of the New Orleans
Medical Society (Boyce 1906, 18). Then, on July 23, a public address signed by Dr.
Kohnke, and Dr. J. H. White announced the “existence of an emergency” that “required
the attention of every individual” (Carrigan 1988, 6). A transcript of the official notice is
included below in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Official Transcript of the public address by Dr. Quitman Kohnke, 1905.
Source: Boyce 1906, 19.
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Every effort was made to put these measures in place. In New Orleans citizens
formed groups of volunteers to go out into “the seventeen wards of the city” to oil and
screen cisterns as well as clean premises (Carrigan 1988:7). Augustin relates his
experience as follows:
On July 21st the news reached my ears; on Thursday, the 25th, it was
unobtrusively published in the newspapers. That night I received a note asking
me to meet certain neighbors on the evening of the 26th in the basement of Trinity
Church…the meeting…was to devise a means to place our immediate
surroundings in the best possible sanitary condition with the least possible waste
of time. The Tenth Ward of New Orleans, you must know, runs from the river to
the swamp, and from Felicity to First Streets. Meetings of citizens had already
been called and volunteer work had already begun in several of the other wards
(Augustin 1909, 1027)
This quote is further evidence of the point discussed above, that early preventative
measures helped to slow the spread of the disease. Through cooperation of the public,
steps were put in place quickly once confirmation of the presence of yellow fever was
announced. Groups of volunteers began organizing meetings and preparing premises
against the contagion.
As shown in Figure 11, oil gangs poured kerosene into cisterns to kill eggs and
larvae and covered the cisterns with screens to keep out the pests (Carrigan 1988, 7; The
Great Fever 2006). Doors and windows were screened as well (Carrigan 1988,7; The
Great Fever 2006). The New Orleans Health Board hired men to find fever cases and
screen and fumigate as appropriate (Carrigan 1988:7, The Great Fever 2006). Steps were
taken to help those infected; a “Fever Isolation Hospital” was set up in the Italian District
(Times-Picayune 1905a; Boyce 1906, 19). Detention camps were set up in the adjacent
communities of Avondale, Kenner, and Slidell (Times-Picayune 1905a). People who
went to these detention camps were quarantined for five days, after which they were
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given certificates of health and allowed to travel (St. Tammany Farmer 1905). Also on
July 24, 1905 another case among the Sicilian community in Bunkie, Louisiana was
reported. Those Sicilians who were exposed were taken to a detention camp (TimesPicayune 1905a).
Despite all these efforts, by July 25, 1905, over 50 cases had been reported and
New Orleans Mayor Behrman “issued a proclamation, supplemented by Dr. Kohnke
giving simple instructions, urging the importance of combating the mosquito” (Lafayette
Advertiser. 1905c; St. Tammany Farmer 1905; Times-Picayune 1905a). It was promptly
issued along with several others on July 24, 1905. Appeals to physicians were also
issued. Titles of the official appeals and brief descriptions of those appeals are listed
below:
1. “The Mosquito Campaign” (July 24, 1905) – an official notice of the situation,
calling for the public to cooperate with health officials and detailing the steps
previously listed above for combating the mosquitoes (Boyce 1906, 21-22).
2. “Appeal for Early Notification” (July 24, 1905) – a notice to medical profession
to “report all cases of fever, regardless of type, or certainty of diagnosis” (Boyce
1906, 22-23).
3. “Appeal for Immediate Screening of Suspected Cases and Fumigation” (July 24,
1905) – a notice also sent to doctors calling for them to immediately “screen off
any patients and to fumigate another room with Sulphur, screen it…to allow no
mosquitoes in the room”, when it is prepared “remove the patient to it, fumigating
the room just vacated in the same manner” (Boyce 1906, 23).

74

4. “Appeal for an Educational Campaign” (July 24, 1905) – urging the help of the
clergy “The clergyman, during his rounds and from his pulpit, should be a
valuable agent in the dissemination of this knowledge” (Boyce 1906, 24).
5. “A Warning to beware of the Danger of overlooking the less obvious Breeding
Places of the Stigma” (July 24, 1905) – Appeal to the public to “empty indoor
water vessels” like pitchers, vases, etc. and to “make sure outside urns in
cemeteries are empty of water” (Boyce 1906, 25).
The City Council met and made plans “to protect the city from yellow fever”
through sanitation. Notice in the Lafayette Advertiser “called for a Board of Health
Meeting” to “put town in the best sanitary condition” (Lafayette Advertiser 1905e). July
26, 1905, saw the organization of the cities sixteen Wards “under the charge of…Dr.
Warner…the Citizens’ Volunteer Ward Organization” (Boyce 1906, 28).
The Sicilian community, as noted previously, was not seeking medical help. Col.
A. R. Blakely, Boniface of the St. Charles Hotel was quoted in the July 30 New Orleans
Item as saying that “they [Italians] were of a “suspicious nature” and “are not familiar
with our people nor our customs and are prone to imagine we wish to do them harm.
They secreted the fever for weeks, some of them died, many got well, but unfortunately,
they established the pest” (New Orleans Item 1905). The Sicilians’ fear of authority
figures was stronger than their fear of yellow fever and this contributed to the spread of
the disease. It also contributed to higher death rates among the Sicilian population.
Historical accounts revealed tales of Sicilians who refused to admit they were even ill.
Eleanor McMain, president of the Woman’s League, documented experiences of the
Italian Relief Committee. She recorded the story of Tonio, a Sicilian immigrant who had
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been saving his earnings to bring his wife over from Sicily but unfortunately fell victim
to yellow fever. McMain recorded the conversation between Tonio and the worker who
found him ill in his cot:
‘I no sick – I no sick! But I tell you something!’
‘My poor friend! You are burning with fever. Now lie quiet till I get you a
doctor.’
‘No, no. I go to my work! I no sick, but I tell you something.’ [Tonio then hands
the worker the three-hundred and seventy-five dollars he has saved]
‘There, you, my friend – for my wife in Sicily’ (McMain 1905, 152).
According to McMain, Tonio was forcibly taken to the hospital where he continued to
claim he was not ill and repeatedly refused to drink anything given to him by the nurses
until he saw his friend drink from the same cup (McMain 1905, 154). Before
succumbing to the disease, Tonio again told his relief worker friend, “‘I no sick, I go to
my work!’ Then, again, ‘You won’t forget – the money – for my wife in Sicily?’”
(McMain 1905, 154). Tonio’s story provides a vivid example of the Sicilians’ fear of the
doctors and nurses. Some culturally ingrained belief system was clearly at work. To
explain how this belief may have come to be, McMain noted a legend that illustrates how
this fear may have originated in Sicily:
The Sicilians, I am told, have a legend that when the cholera occurs in their
country they are poisoned to death by the authorities, if they are considered
hopelessly ill. The yellow fever coming upon them, from they know not whence,
has been regarded by them as the same thing, or something similar, and they have
been distrustful and suspicious of the many efforts that have been made to help
them (McMain 1905, 154)
Fear is a strong motivator. It is not surprising that Sicilians would not trust the
health officials in New Orleans. Fearful tales of sick people being murdered by their own
government would make anyone look askance at uniformed officials demanding to oil
and screen one’s cisterns. It could that they thought the oil in the water was making them
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sick instead of the yellow fever virus. The Italians, however, were not the only ones
resisting the efforts of the relief workers and the official sanitation crews. Augustin
(1909) related an incident among the relief workers:
One hard-headed old Irishwoman obdurately refused to allow her cistern to be
oiled. When finally persuaded by one of the most diplomatic of our foremen she
exclaimed; “Well, come in and do it, if yez [sic] is bound to but I don’t believe
yez [sic] can keep the Lord from gittin’ [sic] those He wants by puttin’ [sic] a
little ile [sic] on the cistherns [sic] (Augustin 1909, 1043)
The stubbornness of the Irish woman in the above story is a comical example of how
people of different ethnic groups had their own views about the effectiveness of the
sanitation crews’ efforts.
On July 26, 1905, the Lafayette Advertiser reported that although “every means
known to science” was being used to “restrict the disease to the infected section and
stamp it out”, there had been 50 cases of yellow fever in New Orleans, seventeen
currently under treatment, and 6 deaths (Lafayette Advertiser 1905a). Unfortunately,
despite all these efforts, the city of New Orleans found they could not eradicate the
disease on their own.
On August 4, 1905, the city called for the assistance of the “Public Health and
Marine Hospital Service of the United States” (Boyce 1906, 26; The Great Fever 2006;
The Rice Belt Journal 1905b). This governmental agency was established in 1798 “for
the purpose of the care of disabled sailors at ports in the United States” (Boyce 1906, 35).
Its functions and responsibilities were expanded in 1875 when it became more involved
in the administration of local health and quarantine administration (Boyce 1906, 35). The
surgeon general authorized Dr. Joseph White to take control (Carrigan 1988). Dr.
White’s re-structured system “became so efficient that a screening wagon usually arrived
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within thirty-minutes” after a new case was reported (Carrigan 1988). In New Orleans,
Dr. White established a Marine Hospital Surgeon at the head of each ward and in the
French Quarter formed a depot led by Surgeon Berry (Boyce 1906, 37). He also set up a
main headquarters in the city center with his assistants, Surgeons Richardson and Lazard
(Boyce 1906, 37). From these locations, the doctors could focus on assigned areas,
combating the disease by organizing by wards.
Several meetings were arranged to educate the public and alleviate resistance to
the necessary treatments and preventive measures. Churches, classrooms, halls and
various clubs were utilized (Boyce 1906, 28). The Women’s League also arranged
meetings (Times-Picayune 1905e). The City Health Officer, Dr. Kohnke, and yellow
fever expert, Dr. O. L. Pothier participated, outlining the source of the yellow fever, and
discussing Dr. Reed’s work in Cuba (Boyce 1906; Times-Picayune 1905e). Boyce gives
a detailed description of Dr. Kohnke’s presentation:
The City Health Officer was especially active in giving almost every night to
large audiences a lantern demonstration of the life history of the Stegomyia,
throwing upon the screen by means of the lantern the ‘wiggle waggles’ kept alive
in a water cell….lectures were given in English and there languages, and no
section of the very mixed population of New Orleans was left out…all religious
denominations co-operated…lent their churches...the coloured [sic] people were
organized and many meetings were held among them (Boyce 1906, 29; Kohnke
1906, 89-94)
Dr. Kohnke’s slide presentation and Dr. Pothier’s talks were apparently very
popular and led to many Sicilians being convinced of the importance of following the
sanitation measures. Dr. O. L. Pothier, besides providing his yellow fever expertise, also
noted the Sicilians “intense fear of the fever and of the measures necessary to stop its
spread” (Times-Picayune 1905e). He urged the native population and educated Italians,
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such as priests, nuns, and civic leaders to help educate those immigrants who were still
unwilling “to submit to the proper treatment and take the necessary measures” (TimesPicayune 1905e). With the help of these presentations, and assistance from “their own
priests, and leading men [Italian civic leaders], they, too, became more amenable” (Boyce
1906, 28). Due to these educational efforts, many Sicilians began to see the benefits, and
by September 11, 1905, many of them began “to ask that their homes be fumigated”
(Times-Picayune 1905b).
Unfortunately, some still refused to listen. Dr. V. O. Schayot, Health Officer,
filed a written complaint on September 24, 1905, to District Attorney Wilkenson that a
group of Italians on Point Celeste Plantation refused treatment and “threatened to shoot
any doctor who crossed their fence line or came on their premises” (Times-Picayune
1905c). Wilkenson advised Dr. Schayot to “allow no one in and no one out” and to
advise the “Negro population there to fumigate as they could” (Times-Picayune 1905c).
No arrests were made, for to have done so would have risked bringing the carriers of
yellow fever into healthy communities; therefore, they would wait until the yellow fever
had ended (Times-Picayune 1905c). Clearly, the fears of the immigrants proved an
extremely difficult obstacle to overcome. Still, a large effort was made to reach across
racial and ethnic barriers, as well as those of religion, class and language (Carrigan 1988,
11). Businessmen and professionals of all races, and ethnicities, including women’s
clubs, politicians, and various religious leaders joined the cause (Carrigan 1988, 11).
Italian societies appointed committees and went door-to-door to explain to their
countrymen what needed to be done (Carrigan 1988, 11). Unfortunately, the Sicilians
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still tended to keep fever cases quiet; therefore, the residents of Little Palermo made up
51% of the city’s fever mortality rate until late August (Carrigan 1988, 12).
In the middle of that same month, the epidemic hit its peak, with 100 people
diagnosed in one day (Carrigan 1988, 16; The Great Fever 2006). Over September and
October, cases gradually diminished and disappeared, when the weather turned cooler
(Carrigan 1988, 15). At the epidemic’s end, there had been 3,400 cases with a total of
452 deaths from yellow fever in New Orleans (Carrigan 1988, 15; United States. “Public
Health Service Annual Report 1905-1906"; 145) Throughout the state, yellow fever had
claimed over 500 lives out of nearly 6,000 cases (New Orleans Daily Picayune, October
11, 16, 1905 as cited by Carrigan 1988, 15).
The persistence of some residents to stay quiet about cases of illness kept the
epidemic, and the possibility of its spread, alive. This in turn, led to stronger efforts of
the Marine Hospital Surgeons that finally helped the decline in yellow fever cases as well
as deaths. However, when federal health officials in New Orleans realized that the
mosquito doctrine was still not fully accepted, they created a circular titled, No
Mosquitoes, No Yellow Fever, and published 100,000 copies (Carrigan 1988, 8). These
coupled with other available forms of communication, such as radio, pamphlets, fliers,
buttons, posters, telegraphs, and more meetings designed to reach those who did not read
(Carrigan 1988, 10). Newspapers also kept up a “steady stream of editorial propaganda”,
promoting the proper “expert management” of the “war on the mosquitoes” (Carrigan
1988, 8). An example of the type of advertisements printed at the time is reproduced in
Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Mosquito Campaign Poster in New Orleans, 1905.
Source: Boyce, Robert William. 1906, 58.

These efforts made an impressive difference in combating the disease. The
Mosquito Education Campaign, along with the work of the United States Marine
Hospital, reached into peoples’ homes and saved lives. With the help of local health
officials, Italian priests and nuns, they crossed language, and cultural boundaries to create
trust in a distrustful ethnic group. These efforts helped to influence the Sicilian
populations’ move toward Americanization by opening the door to communication and
future interactions, with native New Orleanians. I argue that it was through those later
interactions that Sicilians began to relax their suspicious ways and native New Orleanians
began to lose some of the prejudices that kept them apart.
Finally, the effort to eradicate the mosquitoes during the 1905 epidemic represents
the first successful battle against yellow fever in the United States. It is also an example
of what can be achieved when governmental agencies work together toward a common
goal regarding managing major health crises. The profound difference in the number of
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deaths from the scourge during the years 1898 and 1905 serves as testimony to this fact
as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Comparison of Total Yellow Fever Cases and Deaths for 1898 and 1905.
Year

Number of Cases

Number of Deaths

1898

13,817

3,984

1905

3,384

443

Source: Boyce 1906, 52.

As the chart shows, the 1898 yellow fever epidemic resulted in nearly 14,000 cases of
yellow fever, and nearly 4,000 deaths; meaning that approximately 28% of all of those
who were infected died from the disease. In comparison, in the 1905 epidemic,
approximately 3,400 people were infected resulting in almost 500 deaths, meaning that
13% of those infected died. In simpler terms, in 1898, 28% of all cases resulted in death,
as compared to 1905 when only 13% of all cases of infection were fatal. Therefore, the
efforts of the Marine Hospital Surgeons, other governmental officials, and sanitation
crews during the 1905 yellow fever epidemic successfully reduced the number of deaths
per cases of infection by nearly half, essentially ending the threat of future yellow fever
epidemics in the United States; 1905 was the last time Yellow Jack would bring an
epidemic to the United States.
The Yellow Fever Connection
The events during the yellow fever epidemic worked to highlight the differences
between the Sicilians and their neighbors. Their cultural beliefs, especially those of
campanilismo, and their distrust of authority figures left them more vulnerable to yellow
fever. It is evident that the yellow fever epidemic, coupled with the ongoing
82

discrimination and violence perpetrated against Sicilian immigrants, served as motivators
that opened Sicilian immigrants’ eyes to the realization of their differences. This
awakening, in turn, prompted the immigrants to declare themselves “white”. Thus, began
their assimilation into the white society around them.
Connections
The transformation of Sicilian ethnic identity from dago to white was facilitated
by the adaptations forced upon the Sicilian community by outside forces. The political
machinations of the white majority placed the Sicilian and Italian community in a
precarious position; considered by many as neither white, nor black but somewhere inbetween the two. This ambiguous racial situation led to acts of discrimination, prejudice
and violence against members of the Sicilian community. These politically charged
events coupled with the yellow fever epidemic, led the Sicilian community to re-evaluate
their societal position.
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CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSION
“…the success of Italian immigration was transforming the new visitors from
Europeans to Americans” (Gauthreaux 2014, 25)
This story about Sicilian immigrants’ experiences in Louisiana is ultimately about
identity transformation and assimilation into a new society. Assimilation can be defined
as a “process of simplification”, where “ethnic minorities shed themselves of that which
makes them distinctive” (Alba 1999, 7). The experience of the Sicilian community in
New Orleans is an example of this assimilation process. By shedding their fear of the
authorities, and allowing government and local officials to oil their cisterns, screen their
homes, and treat their sick (Times-Picayune 1905b), the Sicilian immigrants let go of a
part of their cultural distinctiveness. Furthermore, by declaring that they were not
“white-skinned negroes” (Villari 1906 as cited by Edwards-Simpson 1996, 1), and by not
allowing Louisianans to treat them the same way as the treated native blacks (Baiamonte
1969, 95), they were insisting on their “whiteness.” They proclaimed themselves more
European than Mediterranean, placing themselves firmly among the majority. As soon as
1908, the Sicilian and Italians were becoming a more respected part of the community as
evidenced by an article in dated June 8, 1908. In relating the Italian Society’s sixtysecond anniversary celebration, the article describes the Society’s members as having a
“great love for liberty” (Times-Picayune 1908). It also quoted Mayor Behrman who
praised the “thrifty disposition” and “good works” that had been accomplished by the
Italian Society in the city (Times-Picayune 1908). These descriptions were far more
positive than those from just a few short years before.
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Utilizing the concepts by Gravlee (2009), Burkholder (2010), and Jaspal and
Cinnirella (2011), it was possible to interpret the experiences of the Sicilian immigrant
population in New Orleans during the 1905 yellow fever epidemic to show that it was a
combination of things that influenced the evolution of Sicilian ethnic identity. First,
ethnic identity construction is influenced by one’s choices, experiences, and personal
motivations. How people see themselves within their own cultural mindset provides a
foundation for their behavior and actions. This thesis argues that Sicilians’ choices began
this journey of ethnic transformation. Their original choices about their personal identity
were ultimately changed through the social inequalities they faced and the identity and
physical threats they experienced. Their desire for economic success also drove them to
change not only how they viewed themselves, but how they were viewed by others.
These concepts framed the story of the Sicilian community’s transformation from Dago
to White. Prodded by traumatic circumstances and motivated by the desire to succeed in
New Orleans society, Sicilians opened their closed-off, insular society and began to
transform their identity. Figure 14 provides a graphic representation of this concept.

Figure 14. Ethnic Development Formula.
Sources: Becker 2015; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2011; Nagel 1994 [Formula my own].
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It was through a combination of social inequalities in the form of racial, ethnic
and political discrimination, the joint threats of disease and physical harm, and the
transformative power of need in the face of the epidemic that influenced Sicilian ethnic
evolution. This thesis argues that Sicilian immigrants were driven by experiences and the
personal desire to change how they were viewed by others. The events prior to, and
during the epidemic, highlighted the perceived differences that set the Sicilian apart from
their American neighbors. The devastating effect of the yellow fever epidemic upon the
Sicilian community placed them in desperate need and forced them to open their closedoff society to those who were trying to help. This opening of their society, coupled with
their desire to become economically successful Americans, broadened their interaction
with native New Orleanians. This interaction facilitated the Sicilian community’s
transition from “Dago” to “white.” Although the transformation did not happen
overnight, this “racial whitening” of the Sicilian community continued throughout the
early twentieth century. As Edwards-Simpson so aptly stated, “by the 1920s, Sicilians
had become white” (Edwards-Simpson 1996, 2). They were Dagoes no longer; along
with the rest of their non-Sicilian compatriots, they had become Italian-Americans
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APPENDIX A – Steps to Prevent the Spread of Yellow Fever (Carroll, 1905)
1. Our physicians, or at least those who are in control, must disabuse their minds of
the impression that black vomit necessarily occurs in the majority of cases of
yellow fever.
2. During the epidemic season, viz.: from May 1 to October 31, and in the epidemic
zone, physicians should be required to report to the health authorities,
immediately, all cases of fever of any kind that come under their observation,
whether among their patients or not, and failure to do so should be made
punishable under the law.
3. The board of health should be authorized to appoint, with proper compensation, a
commission of three experts, all of whom should be men of high reputation as
diagnosticians. It should be the duty of this commission to visit without delay all
cases of fever reported to the health authorities, and the onus of diagnosis should
rest upon the commission and not upon the attending physicians. They (the
commission) should visit each patient daily until the diagnosis is established or
the patient sent to a hospital, and they should forward promptly to the health
department a written report at each visit. The commission should determine
whether or not the patient shall be treated as a possible case of yellow fever and
their decision should be final and obligatory upon all concerned.
4. All patients presenting the symptoms of yellow fever, and all cases not diagnosed
but remaining under suspicion, should be promptly removed for treatment to a
hospital especially located and provided with wire screens and mosquito nets, and
the whole or a portion of which has been set apart for that purpose. The yellow
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fever wards or hospital should be under the direct control of the senior diagnosis
commission and the patients should be treated by physicians appointed only on
their recommendation and acting under their direction.
5. In exceptional cases, to be determined by the commission, patients under
observation awaiting diagnosis could be treated in their homes beneath mosquito
netting, and in rooms properly protected with wire screens, until the nature of the
case had been finally settled to the satisfaction of the commission.
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